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THE JEWISH CONNECTION:
JUDAISM, JERUSALEM, AND
THE TEMPLE
RICHARD LIVINGSTON

Jerusalem's intrimic holiness within Judaism has its roots in the history and mythology of the religion. Even as the world was created, Jerusalem was intended to be the sacred site for the Temple. Scriptural accounts often reverence that foture site as a place for
divine experiences to occur. In time the holy Temple was built, finally allowing the Jews a chance to worship. Yet, the magnificent
structure was destroyed and the Jews scattered, destroying the Jewish dream. Continuing until today. the Temple and the city of
Jerusalem have remained holy in Judaism.

INTRODUCTION
"If I forget thee, 0 Jerusalem, let my right
hand forget [her cunning]. If I do not remember
thee, let my tongue cleave to the roof of my mouth;
if I prefer not Jerusalem above my chief joy" (Psalm
137:5-6)* Such were the sentiments of the Psalmist
almost three millennia ago, and these feelings are still
carried within the soul of the religious Jew to this
very day. I Rabbinic tradition teaches that "there is no
beauty like that of Jerusalem," and that, "of the ten
measures of beauty that came down from heaven,
Jerusalem received nine." Additionally, whoever has
not seen Jerusalem in all its splendor has never seen
a beautiful city in his or her life.' From the time it
began its greatest rise in prominence during the
reigns of King David and Solomon (c. 1000-950
B.C.E.), Jerusalem has been the center of Judaism
both physically and spiritually. In fact, at least twice
each day the orthodox follow the example of Daniel

'All biblical scriptures are quoted from the King James
Version of the Bible, unless otherwise noted.

when they face Jerusalem to pray. The sacred character of the city is simply unparalleled within the faith.
Three of the world's most influential
religions-Christianity, Judaism, and Islam-all revere Jerusalem with the warmest affection. Christianity and Islam share a common thread in that the
greatest individuals within both faiths participated
in their most significant spiritual experiences there.
Within the minds and hearts of the followers of Jesus
of Nazareth, it was the ministry, crucifixion, and
resurrection of their Lord and Savior that forever
imbued the city with absolute holiness. For Muslims,
the spiritual prominence of Jerusalem was established as a result of the night-vision of Muhammad,
who was carried from Mecca, across the Arabian
desert, and ascended into the highest heaven from
Mount Moriah (where the al-Aksa mosque and the
Dome of the Rock are currently located). This event
later established Jerusalem second only to Mecca in
importance within Islamic tradition. Although Abraham is often viewed as the father of Judaism, practically speaking the role of founder was filled by Moses
when he became their great prophet and priest. For
all intents and purposes, the Jewish religion was born
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at Mount Sinai, where he received the divine law that
would come to govern their lives to this very day.
If the Jewish nation was born at Sinai, then the
forty-year journey through the barren wilderness was
the babe's cradle, Canaan was its childhood, and
Jerusalem would become its highest school of learning. Even today, it provides and teaches the most difficult lessons of human life. The events that took
place anciently provided Jerusalem's inhabitants and
the Jews in general with extreme tests of faith. Today,
even when all the other issues seem to have a possible
resolution, Jerusalem is the biggest sticking point in
negotiations. Thus, the city remains a crucible in the
sometimes painful tests of one's faith. What is most
important to this discussion, however, is that, unlike
Christianity and Islam, the place where the foundational event in Jewish history took place, Mount
Sinai, is not given the greatest veneration. Granted,
this may have a lot to do with the fact that no one
knows for sure exactly where Mount Sinai is, that the
Sinai peninsula is currently controlled by an Arab nation, or even, as David Goldstein suggests, that it may
be due to the original prohibition against drawing
close to the mountain (Exodus 19:12,21-24).' Regardless, the fact that Mount Sinai is not given the
most veneration remains true nonetheless. Then what
is it that sets Jerusalem apart from the rest of the
world? The holiness and sanctity of Jerusalem within
the Jewish psyche can be attributed to its most sacred
shrine-the Temple.
JERUSALEM IN THE JEWISH COSMOS

"The concept of 'holy site,' with the exception
of Jerusalem and the Temple, hardly figures in early
rabbinic literature," observes Goldstein. 4 This is most
certainly true, and where there are exceptions, they
almost always deal with temple-types, such as Mount
Sinai and the tabernacle. Jewish lore and legends are
rich in discussions of the cosmological significance of
Jerusalem (i.e., the geographical layout of this planet
and the entire universe in relationship to the city).
These traditions provide us with some of the most
vivid proofs that the Temple is the axiom around
which the holiness of Jerusalem spins within Judaism.
Therefore, I would like to begin by reviewing several
examples, each of which have become models or
paradigms that illustrate the centrality of the Temple
and by extension, Jerusalem. As Joshua Leibowitz observes, "When the universal character of the center of
divine worship is emphasized, ... there is no clear
distinction between the Temple and the city.'" These
are not to be taken as literal presentations of the way
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things physically are, though it is almost certain that
anciently many individuals accepted them as such.
Rather, this is meant to present a spiritual or philosophical understanding of the relative importance of
Jerusalem, and, in particular, the Temple, to the rest
of creation.
Our first legend is based upon a biblical idiom
dealing with interpersonal relationships, which has
even carried into the modern Hebrew language. This
phrase is scattered throughout the scriptures, and it
speaks of finding favor in the eyes of another, whether
the other is an individual or even God. Tucked
within the legends surrounding the creation of Adam,
Louis Ginzberg reports a tradition that says that "the
world resembles the ball of his [God's] eye: the ocean
that encircles the earth is like unto the white of the
eye, the dry land is the iris, Jerusalem the pupil, and
the Temple the image mirrored in the pupil of the
eye."" In Western tradition, the eye has become
"the window" to one's soul. In modern Hebrew, to
find favor in the eyes of someone is typically used in
context of the expressions of affection between a man
and a woman. The eye is the organ which provides
the ability to visibly perceive the world. If the Temple
is mirrored in God's eye, that means it is ever-present
in His eyes. The implication should be clear, then,
that in the eyes of the Lord, the most holy and significant spot on earth is the Temple of Jerusalem.
The Temple of Jerusalem is also viewed as that
which provides nourishment and order to the rest of
the world. In other words, without the sustenance
which flows from the Temple, the world would be in
utter chaos and eventually die from "starvation." A
pseudepigraphic writing attributed to Philo called
Liber Antiquitatum Biblicarum (LAB) presents this
concept through a fascinating metaphor. Moses
pleads on behalf of the Children of Israel following
the golden calf incident:

Thou art God who has planted one vine, and
hast set its roots in the abyss, and hast
stretched out its branches up to Thy highest
seat. ... And now, if Thou be angry with Thy
vine, and uproot it from the abyss and dry up
its branches from Thy highest and everlasting
seat, never again shall the abyss come to
nourish it, nor shall Thy throne come to refresh that vine of Thine which Thou hast
burned. For Thou art He who art all light,
and hast decorated Thy house with precious
stones and with gold, and also with perfumes,
spices and balsam-wood, and cinnamon, and
with roots of myrrh and costum Thou hast
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decorated Thy house.... If therefore Thou
hast no pity on Thy vine, 0 Lord, all things
have been made for nothing, and Thou shalt
not have anyone to glorify Thee .... For if
Thou shouldst abandon the world completely, then who will perform for Thee what
Thou hast spoken as God?"

Notice that, in this passage, the concept of the
vine of Israel is interrwined with the Temple. Just as
Jerusalem and the Temple are inseparable, so are these
rwo ideas. In fact, the Bible supports the notion that
this concept did actually originate at the time of the
Exodus. In a song of triumphant exultation after
the Children of Israel miraculously passed through the
Red Sea, they proclaimed, "Thou [God] shalt bring
them [the Israelites] in, and plant them in the mountain of thine inheritance, in the place, 0 Lord, which
thou hast made for thee to dwell in, in the Sanctuary,
o Lord, which thy hands have established" (Exodus
15:17, emphasis added). Thus, the vine could never
be fully planted without a sacred shrine, or in other
words, holy ground in which to plant it. Furthermore,
not only is Israel dependent upon this planting, but the
vine is also the link berween the three cosmic zonesthe abyss or underworld, the earth, and the heavens. It
is essentially an axis mundi, or center around which the
world rotates, and if God removed it, the world would
cease to exist.
Hayward sums up the intimate connection berween the Temple, the vine, and the physical world
this way: "If Israel is uprooted, the earthly sanctuary
which Moses has been ordered to construct according
to an heavenly exemplar will never be built, and then
creation will have been in vain, to no purpose, for
God will have no one to glorifY Him. The vinesymbol belongs firmly in the realm of beliefs about
the Temple."8 In later verses, the LAB also teaches that
after the Fall of Adam, chaos was unleashed into the
world, and order was only re-established following
the Flood through the sacrificial offerings made by
Noah. Further, the sacrifices of Noah were simply
precursors to those prescribed in the Law of Moses,
which can only be properly performed in a temple.
Thus the festivals, along with their sacrificial rites,
both of which took place at the Temple, were viewed
not only as providing seasonal harmony and agricultural success, but order to the entire world. If the vine
were to be cut down and, as a result, the Temple left
desolate, it would then mean "the end of the world as
they knew it," because as long as the Temple "stands,
and the Service is maintained, Jews provide for

non-Jews an order providing the food and sustenance
without which human life would be impossible.""
This tradition becomes even more intriguing
when placed next to one of our oldest firsthand descriptions of the Temple given by Aristeas, a Greek
courtier of Ptolemy II (285-246 B.C.E.). The Temple
has always been perceived as a conduit, so to speak,
reaching into the heavens and carrying forth the petitions of humankind, which is the reasoning behind
praying in the direction of the Temple. It is as if
one's prayer traverses horizontally until it reaches
the Temple where it is then carried upward into the
celestial realms. However, the Temple's opposing connection to the abyss or underworld has not always
been as clear. The vine metaphor mentions that
its branches stretched high into the heavens, and its
roots reached deep below into the watery abyss,
which has often been associated with the chaotic
waters of creation from which the world was created
and land first emerged. Whether he intended to or
not, Aristeas helps provide a possibility for the missing link. He writes that the Temple had an "endless
supply of water, as if indeed a strongly flowing natural spring were issuing forth from within." 10 He
appears to be absolutely awestruck and then describes
in some detail the underground reservoirs which
flowed in and around the foundations of the Temple.
When water is mentioned in a mythical or
religious context, there are often rwo dichotomous
symbols that emerge. John Lundquist points out that
"water has a rwo-fold imagery, life-giving and destructive."11 Isaiah uses the concept of water to teach
that whoever is not in line with the "sure foundation"
or cornerstone of the Temple will be swept away by
destructive waters (Isaiah 28: 16-17). Ezekiel's
prophecy, on the other hand, illustrates the life-giving
power of water as it flows from the Temple easrward
and heals the most mineral encumbered liquid on the
planet-the Dead Sea (Ezekiel 47). Aristeas' description seems to illustrate both concepts at once; that
life-giving waters flow forth from the Temple to
the rest of the earth, as well as the notion that the
Temple was founded upon the waters of chaos from
which the earth was created. 12 Therefore, the Temple
has its roots in the primordial waters of creation,
which provide the cosmos with nourishment, as previously noted by Philo in his vine metaphor. This
leads nicely to the most vivid cosmological models of
all--certainly they have become the most famouseach of which may be placed within the category of
Jewish creation mythology.
Whether it be the world itself, a city, a sacred
shrine, or even one's home, Mircea Eliade argues that
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"a universe comes to birth from its center; it spreads
out from a central point that is, as it were, its
navel . . . every construction or fobrication has the
cosmogony as paradigmatic modeL"13 Hebrew tradition
supports this paradigm stating that "The Most Holy
One created the world like an embryo. As the embryo
grows from the navel, so God began to create the
world by the navel and from there it spread out in
all directions."14 Where is the navel of the earth?
According to the Midrash, "As the navel is set in
the middle of a person so is Eretz Israel the navel
of the world, as it is said: 'That dwell in the
navel of the earth' [Ezekial 38:12]. Eretz Israel is
located in the center of the world, Jerusalem in the
center of Eretz Israel, the Temple in the center of
Jerusalem, the heikhalin the center of the Temple, the
ark in the center of the heikha/, and in front of
the heikhal is the evan shetiyyah ["foundation stone"]
from which the world was started."" Though it is
debated amongst scholars, one will notice the implication here that Ezekiel is the source of this
concept. 16 Regardless of the source, the ultimate
center of centers is the stone upon which the ark
of the covenant was placed in the Holy of Holies.
One end of the umbilical cord of the earth is connected to the Temple: the opposite end is connected
to its source of life-the heavens. One Rabbi
summarized the idea this way: "It is called the Foundation Stone of the Earth, that is, the navel of
the Earth, because it is from there that the whole
Earth unfolded."I?
Ginzberg helps explain the source and reasoning behind this myth. He writes that the Holy Land
was "created before all other parts of the world ....
Instead of Palestine in general, Jerusalem ... or the
site of the temple is designated as the beginning of
creation. The widespread popular notion that the
earth came into being as a result of a stone which
God had thrown into the water ... was subsequently
brought into relation with the view that creation
began with the site of the temple; hence the legend
that creation began with the stone found in the holy
ofholies."I8 Seth Kunin spends some time in his book
God's Place in the World debating the question of
whether or not Jerusalem is holy intrinsically or contextually. In other words, did the Temple imbue the
city with holiness (contextually) or is it holy in and
of itself (intrinsically), regardless of whether or not
the Temple was built there?I'! Kunin argues against the
notion of Jerusalem's intrinsic holiness. However, if
these myths carry a kernel of truth, they, along with
other historical events I will mention later, would certainly indicate otherwise.

In modern Hebrew, there are several verbs
used to describe movement from one location to
another. To go somewhere is to haldkh. To travel
somewhere, as on a trip, is to nasdh. However, there
are unique verbs used to describe going to and from
Jerusalem. The word used for going there is aldh,
which literally means to go up or ascend. It is from
this root that the noun aliydh comes, which is emigration to Israel from any other country. The verb
used to describe leaving the city, regardless of destination, is yardd, which literally means to go down
or descend. Therefore, one does not simply go to
the city of Jerusalem-one ascends to the city
of Jerusalem. This can best be seen in the Book of
Psalms, where the author asks, "Who shall ascend
into the hill of the Lord? or who shall stand in his
holy place?" (Psalm 24:3), which is a clear reference
to the Temple. The reasoning for this is two-fold.
First, the Temple Mount actually is a hill one may
physically ascend from all sides. Even more importantly, according to tradition, Jerusalem is the highest
spot on earth, and, by extension then, when individuals leave, no matter where they are going, they
always descend from the city.
This notion has its roots in the legends that
associate the Temple Mount with the primordial
mound and cosmic mountain. "In ancient Israel ...
it was the first solid material to emerge from the
waters of creation, and it was upon this stone that
the deity effected creation."OD Donald Parry notes the
following: "Identified as the consecrated topos,
the primordial mound represented order and definition amidst the unruly chaotic waters."21 Logically,
the first land to emerge as the waters receded would
have been the tops of the mountains, they being the
most physically high. It stands to reason that they
would also be viewed the highest spiritually because
of their proximity to the heavens. The top of the
mountain is the highest point on earth and the lowest point in the heavens, and therefore it serves as the
meeting place between the two-the place where
the human may commune with the divine. In fact,
according to "the ancient Hebrew conception of the
universe, God was thought to reside near the North
Star, 'the point around which the constellations
turned, where was located the summit of the heavenly
mountain and the throne of the Most High."'22 This
heavenly prototype came to be known as Mount
Zion; Isaiah, having had direct and personal interaction with God in the temple built there, beautifully
intertwined the concept of a mountain-building
when he called it "the mountain of the Lord's house"
(Isaiah 2:2).

RICHARD LIVINGSTON

Whether or not the above legends are historically, cosmologically, or astronomically accurate is not
important. Myths, legends, and symbols reach
beyond the scientific mind, filling the soul with concepts that greatly enhance one's awareness, and in this
particular case, reveals Jerusalem's hierophantic nature
within Judaism." Each model serves to heighten the
cosmic sacrality of Jerusalem psychologically. When
Jews speak of the sanctity of the city, they do so with
the idea that philologically the ultimate center of the
world itself is the foundation stone upon which
the ark of the covenant rested in the Holy of Holies.
It is the naval of the earth, linking the heavens, the
earth, and the underworld as an umbilical cord or
vine, providing all creation with physical and spiritual
nourishment. In fact, it is the very place from
which all creation sprang forth, including humankind. According to tradition, Adam himself was
formed out of the dust of Jerusalem. 24 Therefore, in
every way conceivable, Jerusalem's Mount Zion is the
center place.
JERUSALEM'S HISTORICAL TRADITION

As I have just mentioned, according to one
rabbinic tradition, the father of the human race was
not simply created from dust of the earth, but rather,
as expected, the dust of Jerusalem's Temple Mount.
An original and somewhat unique Rabbinic tradition
states that "Adam was created from the dust of the
place where the sanctuary was to rise for the atonement of all human sin, so that sin should never be a
permanent or inherent part of man's nature."" Adam
is also viewed as the first high priest in a line of succession reaching all the way down to Aaron, whose
family carried the burden of performing all the sacrificial rituals of the temple. Lastly, not only was Adam
created in Jerusalem and later offered sacrifice on
an altar there as the first priest, he was laid to rest
there as well. The Encyclopedia ofFreemasonry notes a
prophecy that says Adam's body was to be kept above
ground "till a fullness of time should come to commit
it to the middle of the earth by a priest of the most
high God." According to tradition, this apparently
came to pass as the body of Adam was "preserved in
a chest until about 1800 B.C., when 'Melchizedek
buried the body in Salem (formerly the name of
Jerusalem), which might very well be the middle
of the habitable world."''''
If Adam's birth, life, and death all centered in
the area of Jerusalem and the Temple, what might
that imply about the Garden of Eden? Ancient texts

written by Jesus ben Sira and the Book of Jubilees
both, "in their different ways, bring Adam into direct
association with the Temple understood as Eden. "'7
However, Ezekiel is apparently the earliest author to
provide a possible connection. Speaking to the King
of Tyre metaphorically as if the King were Adam,
he wrote: "Thou hast been in Eden the garden of
God ....Thou art the anointed cherub that covereth;
and I have set thee so: thou wast upon the holy
mountain of God .... Thou wast perfect in thy ways
from the day that thou wast created, till iniquity was
found in thee ... therefore I will cast thee as profane
out of the mountain of God" (Ezekiel 28:11-16).
There is clearly an implied connection berween the
holy mountain, which is the Temple Mount, and
the Garden of Eden. Donald Parry has summarized
succinctly the association of the Garden with the
cosmic mountain and the Temple.
The temple became "the architectural embodiment of the cosmic mountain." More
importantly, however, the temple building
was constructed upon a mountain or hillock
of known importance. The temples of
Jerusalem ... all being constructed upon the
identical mount, were part of a continuing
tradition of sacred events that occurred there.
What once was a sacred topos now became a
sacred topos with a sacral architecture superimposed upon it. 28

Thus, from Adam's days in the Garden of Eden, the
Temple Mount in Jerusalem was established as
the holiest spot for Judaism.
The theme of the Book of Jubilees centers in
and around the Israelite calendrical and sacrificial
system. One of its unique characteristics is that it
draws upon the lives of the ancient patriarchs to provide an implied timing for the institution of the
ritual practices that eventually became part of
the Law of Moses. Thus, the author seems to imply
that the lives of the individuals mentioned have a
strong connection to the temple or temple worship.
For example, Enoch "burnt the incense of the sanctuary, (even) sweet spices, acceptable before the Lord
on the Mount. For the Lord has four places on
the earth, the Garden of Eden, and the Mount
of the East, and this mountain on which thou
[Moses] art this day, Mount Sinai, and Mount Zion
(which) will be sanctified in the new creation for
a sanctification of the earth; through it will the earth
be sanctified from all (its) guilt and its uncleanness
throughout the generations of the world" (Jubilees
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4:25-26).* Notice that although four holy places are
mentioned, it is from Mount Zion that purity will
flow, cleansing the whole earth. This reference has
clear implications connecting the offering made by
Enoch to the most holy day of the year within
Judaism, the Day of Atonement, during which offerings were made for the benefit of the entire world.
The Book of Jubilees goes on to teach that
Noah "knew that the Garden of Eden is the holy of
holies, and the dwelling of the Lord, and Mount
Sinai the centre of the desert, and Mount Zion-the
centre of the navel of the earth: these three were
created as holy places facing each other" (Jubilees
8:19).* Therefore, it is understood that even Noah
recognized the importance of the Temple Mount, seeing it as the center of the world. The Tamid, or the
"continual" sacrifice offered in the morning and
evening each day in the Temple, is also linked to
Noah, along with several other sacrificial rites in the
Law of Moses. Hayward summarizes:
When the ... Tamid is sacrificed, therefore,
the writer of Jubilees expects his readers to recall, first, Noah's sacrifice on leaving the ark
and its biblical consequences; second, the
covenant which Noah made not to eat blood;
third, the covenant renewed with blood by
Moses on Mount Sinai; fourth, the Feast of
Weeks on which this covenant was ratified;
and fifth, the forgiveness which the Tamid
itself implores ftom God.'"

The suggestion that is important is the connection
between the sacrifices offered in the Temple and those
offered by the ancient patriarch, which were viewed
as bringing order to the entire universe. Once again it
illustrates the prominence of the Temple with its
connected rituals; just as one cannot separate
Jerusalem from the Temple when speaking of the
city's sanctity, one cannot speak of the Temple without its constituent ordinances. Thus, the Temple adds
to the city's intrinsic holiness to the Jewish psyche.
Many years later, Melchizedek ruled in the
Jerusalem area. The Old Testament provides us with
precious little information about Melchizedek other
then the fact he was the king of a city called Salem, as
well as the fact that "he was the priest of the most
high God" during the days of Abraham (Genesis

*All references to Jubilees are from The Apocrapha and
Pseudepigrapha of the Old Testament in English, ed.
R. H. Charles (London: Oxford University Press,
1913).
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14:18). The extra-biblical sources, rabbinic literature,
and modern scholars all provide ample support for
the thesis that Salem and Jerusalem are the same
city.5O According to Jerusalem: The Eternal City, "there
is an apparent connection between the name-title
Shalem and Salem, where Melchizedek ... reigned as
king in a city called 'Peace.' The toponym Salem
seems to be a short form of the later Jerusalem."31
What does this have to do with the Temple that was
built there some 800-1000 years later? One Jewish
legend says, "Melchizedek, priest of God, King of
Canaan, built a city on a mountain called Sion, and
named it Salem."3' Mount Zion was destined to
become the future location of Solomon's Temple.
This is significant when considered together with the
mountain-building typology I have already noted,
along with the following statement by Josephus: "But
he who first built it [Jerusalem] was a potent man
among the Canaanites, and is in our tongue called
[Melchisedek] the Righteous King, for such he really
was; on which account he was [there] the first priest
of God, and first built a temple, [there,] and called the
city Jerusalem, which was formerly called Salem."3l
Perhaps, then, the Temple of Solomon wasn't the first
"architectural embodiment of the cosmic mound"
to be constructed on that site. Apparently, physical
temples were the center of Jerusalem long before him.
Next is one of the most important events
within the history of Judaism-Abraham and Isaac
(Genesis 22). The ultimate sacrifice ofIsaac was never
required, therefore "the episode in Jewish tradition is
called the binding (Akedah) of Isaac, not the sacrifice
of Isaac."34 Regardless of the reasoning behind why
God put Abraham through one of the most agonizing
experiences imaginable, it is viewed in "the Jewish
mind as the supreme example of perfect faith."3' If
the act was the supreme example of faith, then what
can be said about the location where it took place?
Abraham was over 100 years old, living in Beersheba
at the time, which was at least several days journey
south of Mount Moriah. Clearly there had to be
something significant, even sacred, about the place
God had designated. I will first note the biblical tradition. When the events of that day were complete,
Abraham renamed the place, "Jehovah-jireh [The
Lord-Will-Provide]: as it is said to this day, In the
mount of the Lord, it shall be seen [provided]" (Genesis 22: 14). A vicarious sacrifice, a ram, was provided.
Notice also, as with the previous traditions, there is
a reference to "the mount of the Lord."
As with Melchizedek's city of Salem, the extrabiblical legends about this event are replete. Goldstein
says that "the actual site of the altar which Abraham
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had constructed was the very same place where Abel
and Noah had offered their sacrifICes, and the very
site of the Temple that was to be erected in years to
come."'" The famous Jewish Sage Rambam (Moses
Maimonides) was even more specific when he explained the crucial significance of the altar's location:
"The location of the altar is pinpointed with extreme
precIsion and it may never be moved to another
place . . . [for] we have a universally recognized
tradition that the place upon which David and
Solomon built the altar ... is the exact place upon
which Abraham built the altar and bound Isaac
upon it."3? It should be very clear with this statement
alone, that no other location could possibly carry
such significance, bolstering the notion that the
Temple Mount has profound intrinsic sacredness.
This may prompt a question: if Melchizedek
had built a temple on the same spot, why doesn't the
Bible mention it, and why wasn't Abraham instructed
to offer the sacrifice there? Within Jewish tradition
there is simply no answer. I am aware of only one
dogma that provides a possible explanation. According to the doctrine of The Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-day Saints, just as Enoch "was not; for God
took him," translating him with his entire city
(Genesis 5:24; see also Hebrews 11 :5; Moses 6-7),
thus removing them physically from this world, the
city of Melchizedek also "wrought righteousness, and
obtained heaven" OST Genesis 14:34). Therefore,
because of the holiness of the city of Melchizedek, its
people (city and temple included) may have been
translated (that is, removed from this world and
taken into a higher spiritual realm of existence). It
may even be possible that this took place while Abraham was in Egypt. If this is true, the mount would
have been left barren but would have retained its
qualitative sanctity as a holy place, and therefore, at
least figuratively, Abraham was instructed to go to the
Temple to endure his soul-defining test.
Genesis chapter 28 recounts the fascinating
experience of Jacob, as he began a journey to Haran
in search of a wife in his family's homeland. One
night, as he slept, he had a dream or vision in which
he saw a ladder, which was likely a step-pyramid type
of temple, that had angels ascending and descending
on it. One can easily recognize the obvious models
mentioned already, such as the primal mound, the
axis mundi, and the sacred space which is the meeting
place between heaven and earth. To understand the
significance of the vision the most important thing to
notice is what happened when Jacob woke up the
next morning. He said, "How dreadful [awesome] is
this place! This is none other than the house of God,

and this is the gate of heaven" (Genesis 28: 17). He
then set up the stone which he had slept on as a pillar, poured oil on it, consecrated the stone as holy,
and then named the site Bethel-The House of God.
What is so fascinating to me about this is that there
was no physical building at all, simply "sacred topos,"
to use Parry's words. Yet, he called it the House of
God. Menachem Haran has argued that "in general,
any cultic activity to which the biblical text applies
the formula 'before the Lord' can be considered an indication of the existence of a temple at the site, since
this expression stems from the basic conception of the
temple as divine dwelling-place and actually belongs
to the temple's technical terminology.")8 Thus, the experience with deity makes the space around it holy,
and it is in this way that "the idea or meaning of the
Temple transcended its ephemeral form."}9 However,
as has been illustrated so far, this particular space had
long since become sacred, and it should come as no
surprise that, according to Jewish legend, the stone
upon which Jacob slept and afterward setup as a
pillar is the very same foundation stone which effected creation and upon which the ark of the
covenant would one day rest."
Following the four-hundred-year slavery of
the Children of Israel in Egypt, their subsequent exodus to the Promised Land, and the era of the judges,
Jerusalem was still significant in the time of King
David and Solomon (c. 1000 B.C.E). Prior to David's
conquest of Jerusalem, the Jebusites were using the
area of Mount Zion as a threshing floor: "Then
Solomon began to build the house of the Lord at
Jerusalem in mount Moriah, where [the Lord] appeared unto David his father, in the place that David
had prepared in the threshingfloor of Oman the Jebusite" (2 Chronicles 3: 1). The fact that the Jebusites
were using the sacred site as a threshing floor is significant when one considers the traditions of the
times. First of all, a threshing floor is a place where
stalks of wheat are piled up to crush and separate out
the chaff. This in and of itself carries with it a tremendous amount of religious symbolism (Psalm 35:5;
Isaiah 5:24 ). Secondly, Lundquist and others have
noted a fascinating statement by the scholar Ad de
Vries which says, "The threshing floor is an omphalos, at once a navel of the world (with the hub of ears
in the middle) and a universe-emblem (a round piece
of earth, with the earth in the middle, and the
sun-oxen going round)."4! That David may have had
these symbols in mind when he selected the location
is certainly an intriguing possibility, and it is even
more interesting given the fact that in the ancient
Near East Temple sites are always revealed by deity.
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Certainly, the God of Israel had long since placed his
stamp of holiness upon the site.
Thus, it was several centuries after entering the
Promised Land before the Children of Israel finally
put "the capstone" of their society in place. As is elaborated so beautifully by John Lundquist in his article

The Legitimizing Role ofthe Temple,
the state, as we presently understand that
term as applying to archaic societies . . . did
not come into being in ancient Israel-indeed, could not have been perceived to have
come into being-before and until the
temple of Solomon was built and dedicated.
Solomon's dedicatory prayer and the accompanying communal meal represent the final
passage into Israel of the "divine charter" ideology that characterized state polities among
Israel's ancient Near Eastern neighbors. 42

Leibowirz sums the importance this way: "The conception of the eternity of Jerusalem in the Bible is
related to the monarchy of the House of David, and
must be understood as part and parcel of it. During
the reign of Solomon, the unique status of Jerusalem
as the royal city was established by the erection of the
Temple, which invested the monarchy, as well as
the site, with an aura of holiness. "43 The central focus
of worship throughout the forty year wandering in
the wilderness and the settling into their lands of
inheritance was indeed a temporary temple-the tabernacle-but that was simply a preparation for what
their God had been anxiously anticipating: a permanent house on earth.
This was certainly a watershed moment in the
history of Israel. Unquestionably, the entire Land of
Eretz Israel was considered sacred space, for it was all
part of the divinely decreed Land of Promise. However, as soon as the Temple of Solomon was built, the
psyche permanently changed. Leibowitz observes
further that "the Temple is perceived as the eternal seat
of the Lord ... and there is no doubt that this con-·
ception of a double eternity-that of the dynasty of
David and that of the symbolic residence of the
Lord-imparted sanctity to the whole city."44 In
the minds of the Israelites, the holiest city became
Jerusalem and the most sacred plot ofland became the
Temple Mount. Although the nation of Israel had
been somewhat established and the tribal lands of inheritance had long since been assigned, according to
the vine typology, if they would have stopped there,
this would have only completed their physical gathering. The full planting of God's chosen people in their
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promised land requires a spiritual gathering as well. As
mentioned previously, according to Exodus 15: 17,
this would have never taken place unless the temple
had been erected. Therefore, the kingdom of Israel
was not fully established (and will not be in modern
times) until the temple was (or is) built and dedicated.
Their King could not fully claim his right to the
throne until a "footstool" for the throne of their
Heavenly King was built.
That is not to say, as I have suggested above
and as Kunin would argue, that the Temple Mount
has a contextual sacrality-that it was only after the
building of the Temple that the site became holy.
Rather, this actually serves to solidify its sacral character, once again illustrating the reason for the
city's sanctity within the Jewish consciousness.
Maimonides (II35-I204 C.E.), who has been characterized as "the most illustrious figure in Judaism in
the post-talmudic era, and one of the greatest of all
time,"45 strongly concurs that the city has carried intrinsic holiness since the morning and evening that
became known as "the first day" (Genesis 1:5). He
summarized this chain of sacred events as follows:
By a universal tradition, we know that the
Temple which David and Solomon built
stood on the site of Araunah's threshing floor;
and that is the place where Abraham had
built an altar to sacrifice his son Isaac; and
that is where Noah built an altar when he
emerged from his ark; and that Cain and
Abel offered sacrifices on the altar there,
and that Adam offered a sacrifice there when
he was created, and that indeed, it was from
that spot that he was created ... and why do
I say that the original sanctity of the Temple
and Jerusalem applies forever? Because it
stems from the Divine Presence, and the
Divine Presence is never abrogated:"
This brief summary of several events from the ancient
past-from before God created the world until the
construction of Solomon's Temple-has again solidified the continual sanctity of the Temple Mount
throughout Jewish history.
DESTRUCTION & ExILE, RETURN

& REBUILDING
Following the death of Solomon in 921 B.C.E.,
the northern tribes of Israel declared themselves independent from the Davidic Dynasty of the southern
tribes. The northern Kingdom was continually
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plagued with internal and external turbulence, and
exactly two hundred years later, they were destroyed
and taken captive by the Assyrian Empire. The Assyrians were known for their policy of trans-population,
which is exporting one population and importing a
replacement set of immigrants. The southern Kingdom of Judah had submitted to Assyria rather than
fight. Therefore, they were spared a similar fate
and remained somewhat autonomous for the time
being. However, one hundred thirty-five years later
(586 B.C.E., almost four hundred years since David
moved the Israelite capital to Jerusalem and Solomon
constructed the religious icon par excellence), the city
fell to the Babylonians led by King Nebuchadnezzar,
and the Temple was left in ruins.
And he [Nebuchadnezzar] carried out thence
all the treasures of the house of the LORD,
and the treasures of the king's house, and cut
in pieces all the vessels of gold which
Solomon king of Israel had made in the
temple of the loRD, as the LORD had said.
And he carried away all Jerusalem, and all the
princes, and all the mighty men of valour,
[even] ten thousand captives, and all the
craftsmen and smiths: none remained, save
the poorest sort of the people of the land.
(2 Kings 24:13-14)
Thus, not only was the city and the Temple destroyed, but the majority of the population was exiled
to Babylon.
The lament of Lamentations centers in and
around the Babylonian exile. Two themes dominate
the text: the mourning of the pathetic condition
of the Israelites and the yearning to return to their
Promised Land. "The ways of Zion do mourn, because none come to the solemn feasts: all her gates are
desolate: her priests sigh, her virgins are afflicted, and
she [is] in bitterness" (Lamentations 1:4, emphasis
added). Why were none able to come to the solemn
feats? The answer is that there was no temple in
which they could perform the sacrificial rites associated with the festivals. The female in the verse is the
city of Jerusalem, and that very dilemma-not being
able to completely live the law exactly as it was revealed to Moses because there is no temple-still
faces the Jews today. As if that was not bad enough,
"The adversary hath spread out his hand upon all her
pleasant things: for she hath seen [that] the heathen
entered into her sanctuary, whom thou didst command [that] they should not enter into thy congregation" (Lamentations 1: 10, emphasis added). The sentiment of the loss of the Temple is further presented
in the following verses:

And he hath violently taken away his tabernacle, as [if it were of] a garden: he hath
destroyed his places of the assembly: the
LORD hath caused the solemn feasts and sabbaths to be forgotten in Zion, and hath despised in the indignation of his anger the king
and the priest. The LORD hath cast off his
altar, he hath abhorred his sanctuary, he hath
given up into the hand of the enemy the walls
of her palaces; they have made a noise in the
house of the LORD, as in the day of a solemn
feast. (Lamentations 2:6-7)
The defeat and deportation of many people
within the southern Kingdom was a tremendous
blow in and of itself, but nothing wrenched their
hearts more than the desecration and destruction of
the Temple. The bitter irony here is that it was Israel's
own God that was responsible for the defeat because
of his extreme displeasure with their actions. In other
words, they were unable to save that which meant the
most to them because they had already desecrated it.
Amidst the changes that took place culturally
and religiously amongst the Jews during the next sixty
years in Babylon, one thing never changed: their
yearning to see the Temple rebuilt. Certainly there
were many who had grown accustomed to life in a
foreign land and who were as content to remain there
as return, but this attitude did not reflect the majority. By 538 B.C.E., Cyrus II of Persia had established
the largest empire in the Near East to that point, and
he defeated the Babylonians without shedding one
drop of blood. The Persian rulers were much more
beneficent and humane to their subjects and even
allowed local autonomy and freedom of religion. The
Bible records that
in the first year of Cyrus king of Persia, that
the word of the Lord [spoken] by the mouth
of Jeremiah might be accomplished, the Lord
stirred up the spirit of Cyrus king of Persia,
that he made a proclamation throughout all
his kingdom, and [put it] also in writing, saying, Thus saith Cyrus king of Persia, All the
kingdoms of the earth hath the Lord God of
heaven given me; and he hath charged me to
build him an house in Jerusalem, which [is]
in Judah. Who [is there] among you of all his
people? The Lord his God [be] with him, and
let him go up. (2 Chronicles 36:22-23)
According to Galbraith, Skinner, and Ogden,
authors of Jerusalem: the Eternal City, "few events
in all of ancient Near Eastern history can parallel in
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importance the events that Cyrus set in motion."'?
The first chapter of the Book of Ezra indicates that
the primary concern of the exiles upon returning
was the Temple. As soon as they set foot in the city
they immediately ascended the Temple Mount, rebuilt the altar, and resumed all the sacrificial rites:
"From the first day of the seventh month began they
to offer burnt offerings unto the LORD. But the foundation of the temple of the LORD was not [yet] laid"
(Ezra 3:6). Even before they built homes for their
own families, they began work on rebuilding the
most important house of all.
The work on the Temple was antagonized by
the Samaritans, who wanted to participate but were
rejected by the Jews. The Samaritans, remnants of the
northern tribes, were viewed as nothing more than
half-breeds who had intermarried with the Assyrian
peoples imported into the area when the Israelite
tribes were deported to the north. The Samaritans
took their issues to the courts but were eventually
defeated by King Darius himself. Following a search
for the original proclamation of his father (Cyrus),
Darius decreed, "Let the work of this house of God
alone; let the governor of the Jews and the elders of
the Jews build this house of God in his place" (Ezra
6:7). The work then continued, and the Temple was
constructed under the leadership of Zerubbabel. Unfortunately, the structure wasn't nearly as impressive
or beautiful as its predecessor. Nonetheless, exactly
seventy years after their exile they completed the
building, and the dedication took place in 515 B.C.E.
Assuming Josephus's statement about the Temple of
Melchizedek to be true, Zerubbabel's Temple would
become at least the third formal structure to grace the
Temple Mount and once again firmly established
God's people in their land of divine inheritance.
The last of the Hebrew prophets was Malachi
(c. 400 B.C.E.). He indicated that by this time temple
worship had become entirely corrupted: "But ye are
departed out of the way; ye have caused many to
stumble at the law; ye have corrupted the covenant
of Levi, saith the Lord of hosts" (Malachi 2:8).
Nonetheless, with very few exceptions, for the next
four hundred seventy years, the Temple Mount remained in Jewish hands. This was a time of significant changes within the Jewish faith, most of which
are well out of the scope of this article. Hellenistic
cultural influences, the creation of the governing
body of elders that would later become the Sanhedrin, changes in the priesthood lines of succession,
the evolution of a number of Jewish sects, and the
emergence of the synagogue all played key roles in
Jewish life during these years. In 20 B.C.E. Herod,
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famous for his building programs throughout the
Holy Land, began an incredible construction project
on the Temple Mount that would last nearly eighty
years. During his lifetime, he nearly doubled the size
of the Temple Mount through a massive landscaping
project and completely re-constructed Zerubbabel's
Temple. By the time it was finished, "no other temple
complex in the Graeco-Roman world compared with
it in expansiveness and magnificence. "'8 It even
surpassed Solomon's Temple, but unfortunately its
physical prowess did little to add anything of spiritual
significance.
Amidst the ever-changing face of the religion
and the landscape, Jerusalem remained the center of
Judaism politically and spiritually. That the Temple
maintained its sacred status can be seen in the life of
Paul the apostle: he was almost killed by the Jews, because they thought he had brought a Gentile into the
Temple precincts (Acts 21:26-30). Nevertheless,
the city as a whole remained relatively stable until
about 55 C.E. A band of assassins, known as the
Sicarii, initiated fifteen years of political and miliary
upheaval in Jerusalem and the cities in the Judean
countryside. By the summer of 69 C.E., the Jews
found themselves in a full-scale revolt against the
Roman Empire. The following year, the most powerful Roman legions were sent in to squelch the rebellion. By mid-August, the Romans sieged the Temple
Mount, and on August rwenty-eighth (the ninth of
Ab), they burned the holy sanctuary to the ground.
Notice especially the reaction of the Jews in Josephus's
summary.
As the Temple burned, frenzy gripped both

attackers and defenders. Roman shock troops
burst through, and Titus was able to dash
into the Temple just long enough for brief
look; then heat forced him out. His soldiers
continued burning whatever could be
kindled, and killing all they could reach,
whether combatants, women, or children.
Many Iews flung themselves into the fire and
perished with their Temple. Others, hiding in

corners, were burned ro death as Roman
torches set new flames. [Emphasis added]'"
Within a month, the upper and lower portions of the city were razed to the ground, and the inhabitants were either massacred or taken captive. The
only parts of the entire Temple Mount left intact were
the huge retaining walls that supported the forty acre
platform. One of those walls is the southern most section of the western retaining wall, which serves as
an outdoor synagogue today, a place where Jewish
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pilgrims come to worship, mourn the loss of the
Temple, and pray for its rebuilding. These lamentations led to its nickname-The Wailing Wall.
The ninth of Ab subsequently came to be an
annual day of mourning. It has also come to be associated with several other devastating events, such as
the day in which Solomon's Temple was destroyed
by the Babylonians: "Grief greater than words could
express afflicted the faithful as they recalled what had
been the fate of their temple and its defenders. Some
rabbis were said to have suffered permanent facial
wounds, so furrowed were their cheeks by tears shed
for the temple. . . . A sorrow that seemed to grow
with passing generations became part of the memorial of the vanished temple."'o When the city is glorified, it is glorified because of the Temple. When it is
mourned, it is mourned because of the Temple. There
has been no mourning like this expressed for the loss
of any other city or religious shrine. The only thing
that might come close in comparing with such sorrowful sentiments is Yom ha'Shoah, or Holocaust
Day, in which the six million victims of Hitler's genocide are remembered each year. "My heart is in the
East [where the Jerusalem is and the Temple should
be], while I remain in the depths of the West," wrote
the twelfth-century Jewish poet Judah Halevi. Truly,
there is simply nothing that adequately compares to
the yearnings for the Temple.
LOOKING INTO THE FUTURE

As we have seen so far, the reason for the incomparable adulation by the Jewish people for
Jerusalem is unquestionably a result of the Temple. It
would be expected that the future hopes and dreams
for such a city centers around it as well. The prophecies of such prominent Jewish prophets as Isaiah,
Jeremiah, Ezekiel, Daniel, Zecharia, and others provide some of the most vivid examples of Judaism's
eschatological and esoteric aspects. According to
Leibowitz, "all the prophets share the expectation
of an exalted future for Jerusalem-a loftiness
which includes both physical splendor and a sublime
religious-spiritual significance."" Though most
modern Jews don't concern themselves with such
prophecies, they are nonetheless real and therefore
impact the Jewish consciousness just as much as the
legends and traditions of the past. Just as the historic
statements link the Temple with Jerusalem, so also
the prophetic utterances inseparably connect the two.
Additionally, the prophesies include a unique aspectthe long-awaited Messiah.

Speaking of the Messiah, Zechariah prophesied, "And speak unto him, saying, Thus speaketh the
LORD of hosts, saying, Behold the man whose name
[is] The Branch; and he shall grow up out of his place,
and he shall build the temple of the LORD: Even he
shall build the temple of the LORD; and he shall bear
the glory, and shall sit and rule upon his throne; and
he shall be a priest upon his throne: and the counsel
of peace shall be between them both" (Zechariah
6:12-13). In contrast to bringing about the city's
destruction and the people's exile, as He did when the
Babylonians conquered it, in the last days, a Messianic figure will arise and lead the construction
of the final Temple. In his concluding statements,
Zechariah wrote that the Lord would step forward as
Israel's battle master and bring peace to the city: "And
it shall be in that day, [thar] living waters shall go
out from Jerusalem; half of them toward the former
sea, and half of them toward the hinder sea: in summer and in winter shall it be. And the Lord shall be
king over all the earth: in that day shall there be one
Lord, and his name one.... And [men] shall dwell in
it, and there shall be no more utter destruction; but
Jerusalem shall be safely inhabited" (Zechariah
14:8-11). Just as the vine ofIsrael provides the world
with nourishment when it is planted in the holy
ground of the Temple Mount, the establishment of
the city and its Temple provides order and peace
to the entire world.
As mentioned previously, Ezekiel also discussed the concept of living and healing waters which
flow forth from the Temple:
These waters issue out toward the east country, and go down into the desert, and go into
the sea: [which being] brought forth into the
sea, the waters shall be healed. And it shall
come to pass, [that] every thing that liveth,
which moveth, whithersoever the rivers shall
come, shall live: and there shall be a very great
multitude of fish, because these waters shall
come thither: for they shall be healed; and
every thing shall live whither the river
cometh. (Ezekiel 47:8-9).

As a matter of fact, a significant amount of Ezekiel's
writing deals directly with his tour or vision of what
turns out to be veritable blueprints for this magnificent structure that is yet to be built (Ezekiel 40-44).
Clearly both he and the Lord are very concerned with
this future edifice yet to be built. Lastly, from the
prophet Malachi comes this powerful statement: "Behold, I will send my messenger, and he shall prepare
the way before me: and the Lord, whom ye seek, shall
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suddenly come to his temple, even the messenger of
the covenant, whom ye delight in: behold, he shall
come, saith the Lord of hosts" (Malachi 3: O. As he
appeared on Mount Sinai to Moses and the seventy
elders of Israel when the nation of Israel was born, the
Lord will personally visit the final Temple to establish
his people once and for all. Simply put, every major
event associated with the last days-the final wars,
the coming of a Messiah, the judgment day, and the
resurrection-are all intertwined with reestablishment of the last Temple.
CONCLUSION

Jerusalem is one of the most intriguing cities
in the world. It is uniquely held sacred by three of the
world's great religions. Historians have suggested that
more blood has been spilt over this city than any
other. Even today, it is the impossible barrier to peace
between the Arab-Palestinians and Israelis. The city is
also unique, because, in the midst of the turmoil and
centuries of Diaspora, and perhaps even to a certain
extent because of it, it has maintained its sacral character within the Jewish psyche. In fact, if one has lost
their bearings and is in doubt as to which direction
they should pray, "then they should incline their
hearts towards the Holy of Holies. "sz Jewish traditions provide ample evidence to support the idea that
the past, present, and future of Jerusalem are bound
up in the establishment of the Temple. According to
Jewish theology, in the last days God's chosen people
will once again build a temple on Mount Zion, which
will coincide with the coming of the long-awaited
Messiah. This will usher in an era, which will finally
fulfill the city's long-awaited destiny to live up to its
name-sake-The City of Peace.
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ENDNOTES
I must take a moment to make clear one vital point regarding Judaism in general. It should be understood
at the outset that in discussing the significance of the
city of Jerusalem to Jewish people, in no way do
I assume or assert that all Jews feel the same way. I
learned early on in my Judaic studies that to ask the
question "What do the Jews believe about such and
such?" is extremely open-ended and subject to any
number of responses-not very wise to say the least.
It would be much more proper to ask, "What do
halachic Jews believe about such and such?" I know
of only one dogma that is universal among all Jews,
and beyond that, everything becomes subjective. The
single belief held in common by all Jews is this: there
is a God. Therefore, let me make it clear that when I
speak of the sentiment of the Jewish people towards
anything, I am speaking in very broad terms, but
particularly of religious or orthodox Jews. If this
paper were written in the 1600s, perhaps I could
speak generally with a little more confidence, but
after the major movements such as Hasidism, the
Enlightenment, and the Reform, beginning a statement with "Jews believe ... ," or "Jewish people feel
that ... ," has become more or less impossible.
2 "Jerusalem," Encyclopedia Judaica (Jerusalem: Keter Publishing House, 1972),9:1556.
, David Goldstein, Jewish Legends (New York: Barnes &
Noble, 1996), 15.
, Ibid., 15.
\ "Jerusalem," 9:1553.
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Publication Society of America, 1946-1947),
1:49-50.
C.T.R. Hayward, The Jewish Temple: A Non-Biblical
Sourcebook (London: Routledge, 1996), 159-60.
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'1 Ibid., 167.
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II John M. Lundquist, The Temple: Meeting Place of
Heaven and Earth (London: Thames and Hudson,
1993),6.
12 Ibid., 6-7, 11.
1\ Mircea Eliade, The Sacred and the Profone: The Nature
ofReligion (New York: Harcourt Brace & Company,
1987), 44-45 (cf 65).
" Ibid., 44, emphasis added.
1\ "Jerusalem," 9:1558-59. Bracketed "foundation stone"
defined in the original.
to For further arguments, see Seth D. Kunin, God's Place
in the World: Sacred Space and Sacred Place in Judaism
(New York: Cassell, 1998), 38; see also Hayward,
176 n. 7.
l ' Eliade, 44.
13 Ginzberg" 5: 14.
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W Parry, ed., Temples ofthe Ancient World (Salt Lake
City: Deseret Book Company, 1994), 86.
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While exit polls have come under scrutiny, especially since the recent election cycle, one area that has not been adequately studied is
the effict of non-response on their accuracy. We use a unique dataset to measure whether individuals who refuse to respond to an
exit poll systematically diffir from respondents. We find that the voter's age and race impact their likelihood to not respond. We also
find that, despite previous finding to the contrary, the time of day does not influence response rates when the respondent's demographic characteristics are controlled/or. If an individual's race and age are correlates oftheir vote choice, then higher levels of nonresponse are likely to bias survey results.

Exit polls are surveys of selected voters as they
leave the voting place. These studies generally collect
information on how people voted, political attitudes,
and demographics. News organizations use these data
to predict election results and scholars use them to
study patterns of voting behavior. Exit polls generally
provide accurate predictions within a reasonable margin of error. Like all survey instruments, getting good
results from an exit poll requires a survey design that
reduces systematic biases, the successful implementation of the study, and the proper interpretation of
the results. As the recent presidential elections demonstrate, failure in anyone of these areas will compromise the poll's ability to correctly predict the
election winner. For example, the Voter News Service
poll's predictions for Gore's vote share in Florida was
too high because it underestimated the number of
absentee voters and used the wrong model to predict
turnout when designing its sample. t
Pollsters use scientific sampling techniques
that include some aspect of random selection to
prevent any group from being under-represented
in the sample. These techniques, if used correctly,
ensure that pollsters contact a sample of voters that

is representative of the larger voting pool. However,
those individuals who choose not to respond to a
survey will always be under-represented in a survey,
no matter how well the sample is designed. The exclusion of the non-respondents' opinions would not
impact an exit poll's results if non-response were
random, i.e., if there were no differences in opinion
between respondents and non-respondents. However, studies have shown that non-response is not
random; certain groups are less likely to respond to
surveys than are others.
Systematic non-response is problematic for
pollsters unless controlled for by advanced statistical
methods (Holt & Elliot 1991; Filion 1975-76)
because systematic variation in response rates
between groups will systematically bias a poll's results if the characteristics influencing the decision to
respond also influence how the individuals vote. For
example, exit polls predicted that George Bush's
margin of victory over Pat Buchanan in the 1992
New Hampshire Republican Primary would be only
a few points. The final ballot count gave Bush a 16%
margin. Bush's predicted vote total was suppressed
because Bush voters were less likely to respond to

*Man Singer, C.W. Ross, Eli7-<'lbeth Esry. Jim Jeffries. Beth Snell. Brigham Cannon, Brant Lillywhite. Doug Devore, Jessic1.
Steed. Steve Christensen, Brianne Bogumill. Brent Stoddard, A1.wn Renfro, ;lod Brooke Ollerron.
Thanks ro Drs. Magleby .md Patterson for their encouragement ,lOd help.
'For a summ.uy of the errors made in creating the VNS sample and in the mathematical models used to interpret its results. see
Kurtz 2000. See Traugott & Price 1992, Clymer 1989, ,lnd Ficnberg & Murray 2000 for other examples of biased exit polls.
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exit polls than Buchanan voters (Fienberg & Murray
2000). Because the respondents and non-respondents
systematically differed in a way that was correlated
with how they voted, the failure to correct for the impact of non-response on the survey's results biased its
predictions. This is not an isolated incident; Fienberg
& Murray (2000) document several other recent
examples when variations in response rates between
groups might explain the incorrect predictions of
exit polls.
Because non-response bias is of concern to all
surveyors, there has been considerable scholarship
about the causes of non-response and the differences
between non-respondents and respondents. However,
these studies of non-response have been limited to
telephone, mail-in, and face-to-face studies; there has
been only limited scholarship on the characteristics
of non-response in exit polls and the potential biases
that non-response might introduce to exit poll results. In the 2000 KBYU/Utah College Exit Poll, we
collected data on the demographic characteristics of
non-respondents to correct for this deficiency. Using
this unique dataset, we show that non-respondents
in exit polls differ systematically from respondents in
ways that potentially alter the accuracy of the data
exit pollsters collect.
CAUSES OF NON-RESPONSE
Non-response is part of a larger problem of
undercoverage bias. Scholars of non-response have
categorized non-respondents as individuals who refuse to answer a survey's questions, who lack the ability to respond, or who are inaccessible to the researcher (Cooper & Yu 1983, 36). In the case of an
exit poll, those individuals who vote by mail are, by
definition, inaccessible to the pollster. Their exclusion
is a continual bias in exit polls and one that researchers take into consideration when analyzing a
poll's results. The VNS uses phone surveys and previous election returns to predict the number and content of absentee ballots. For the purpose of this study,
we define a "non-respondent" as a voter who either
refuses to respond or who is not able to respond. The
pollster has access to these individuals but they all decline to participate when selected to receive a survey.
Studies of non-response have focused on
whether or not there is a "hard-core" group of nonrespondents in the population who, due to personal
attributes, are more inclined to refuse to participate.
There are several schools of thought on what cognitive processes might cause people to respond to surveys (Groves, Cialdini & Couper 1992). We propose
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that a general framework for this discussion is that
survey participation, like voting, is an act that has
tangible costs (time and hassle) and no apparent
benefits; a single opinion does not determine a poll's
outcome. Just as voters perceive that they receive intangible benefits from voting (from complying with a
personal or societal norm of civic participation or
from "making your voice heard," for example), survey
respondents also weigh the costs of participating in
a survey, such as the intangible benefits that they can
receive by feeling that they are helpful, feeling that
they have contributed to the poll's results, or supporting the survey's sponsor.
The reasons individuals give for choosing to
respond or not to a survey provide evidence in support of this theory. The most common reasons given
for refusing to respond to surveys are concerns with
the cost of participating (concerns with individual
privacy, fear that information will not be kept confidential, a lack of time, survey length, personal illness
or stress) and beliefs that there is no benefit from
participating (worries that the survey is actually a
marketing ploy or beliefs that their response is inconsequential) (DeMaio 1980; Goyder 1987; Brehm
1993; Groves, Cialdini & Couper 1992). Other research has also found that conscientiousness or a
sense of civic duty, a willingness to be helpful, and
pleasurable association with the questionnaire's
source make people more willing to respond (Pace
1939; Clausen & Ford 1947). Just as the theories predict, non-respondents cite relative costs while respondents cite social benefits and norms.
Empirical research, much of it conduced in
controlled experimental settings, has isolated several
factors that influence the decision to participate in
a survey. These include the survey's methodology, the
survey's content, the context in which the survey is
administered (inside or outside, urban or rural area,
time of day, survey length, etc.), and the respondent's
socio-economic status. A model of costs and benefits
potentially unites these factors into concerns of costs
and benefits.
The way in which a survey is administered influences response rates. Face-to-face interviews have
the highest response rates, while telephone surveys
and mail-in surveys have lower response rates (Weisberg et al. 1996, 121). Face-to-face and telephone
surveys have higher response rates than mail-in surveys because participation is limited to answering
questions instead of mailing a questionnaire. Because
face-to-face and telephone surveys are less inconvenient for the respondent, the costs of participating are lower. Mail-in survey non-respondents cite
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inconvenience as their reason for not completing the
questionnaire 81 % of the time, four times more frequently than they cite the survey's content (Goyder
1987, 138). The percentage of non-respondents who
refuse to respond because of inconvenience drops to
63% in face-to-face interviews and to 55% in telephone surveys.
The survey's content also influences response
rates. People are more likely to respond to a survey on
a subject in which they are interested. Individuals are
also more likely to respond to a survey if it addresses
an issue about which they feel strongly, or if they
identify with, or trust the survey's sponsor (Groves,
Cialdini & Couper 1992). This has serious implications for interpreting survey results: if survey respondents are more interested in a given topic than
non-respondents are, then respondents are not representative of their social class, and variations in
response rates suppress the true magnitude of opinion
differences between groups (Brehm 1993, 186).
The context in which voters receive the survey
influences non-response rate by influencing the cost
calculations of voters. For example, non-response
might be more frequent in precincts where the exit
poll is administered outside or in bad weather conditions than in precincts where the pollster is stationed
indoors because potential respondents are less willing
to fill out a questionnaire if it requires becoming cold
or wet. These factors should influence non-response
rates among all demographic groups and in all types
of surveys.
In Utah, there is no law about where organizations can conduct polls as long as they do not
hamper the voting process. Generally, our goal is to
place our pollsters just inside the doorway of the
building where voting is occurring in order to keep
them and the respondents warm while they take the
poll. However, where pollsters are located at any given
voting location is at the discretion of the election
officials at each precinct. Often, these officials request
pollsters be located outside the building or in the
parking lot, citing concerns with pollsters disrupting
the voting process or potentially compromising the
secrecy of the voting decision. One might suspect that
pollsters at any given polling station are equally likely
to be inside or outside and that this is independent
of the characteristics of the precinct. If the location of
the pollster is random, then increases in non-response
due to being outside will have no systematic impact
on the survey's accuracy. If, however, the ideological
characteristics of a precinct are related to the ideological characteristics of the election official, and if the
ideological characteristics of the election official are
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related to his or her propensity to refuse to allow pollsters to be inside the building where polling is taking
place, then increased non-response at precincts where
the poll is conducted outside will bias the results.
Likewise, the time of day might influence
non-response rates, with people being less willing
to respond in the morning when they are rushing to
work and. in the evening when they stop at the
polling place after work and are in a rush to go home.
If the time of day influences non-response in an exit
poll, then there is a systematic bias because different
groups of voters vote at different times (Busch &
Lieske 1985).
Despite the fact that it is one of the most commonly cited excuses, there is some debate as to
whether the length of the survey impacts nonresponse. Some studies have found that survey length
has a slight, negative effect on response rates; increasing survey length increases non-response (Brown
1965; Dillman, Reynolds & Rockwood 1991; Sletto
1940). Conversely, other research has shown that
there is no relationship between the two factors
(Heberlein & Baumgartner 1978; Scott 1961).
Because an individual can only be certain of a survey's
length once he or she has accepted it, we think that
it is likely that a survey's length influences only the
probability of an individual not completing it once
they have accepted it instead of influencing the
probability that an individual will not accept it at
all. However, in the KBYU survey, all the forms
appear to be the same length, so we cannot test this
proposition.
One significant contextual factor is whether
the person is contacted in a rural or utban area. A
Census Bureau Survey found that "rural people
were significantly more likely to cooperate than were
urban dwellers" (DeMaio 1980, 229): Charlotte
Steeh likewise found that the lowest refusal rates
were obtained in small towns and the highest in
large metropolitan centers (1981, 46). One reason for
why those that live in urban areas are less willing
to be interviewed is that they generally are busier
and live in areas with higher crime rates (Brehm
1993,35).
Another contextual factor, emphasized by
Groves, et al. (1992), is the interaction between the
respondent and the interviewer. They theorize that an
individual's likelihood of not responding depends
more upon the characteristics of the interviewer that
approaches him or her than the interviewer's technique. People are more positively disposed to people
whom they perceive to be like them. Studies of
"social desirability" have shown that an interviewer's

The Census Bureau's definirions ac,,: "urban" comprises .lll persons living in urbanized areas and in places of 2,500
or more oU[side urbanized areas; "rural" incluedcs all (he remaining population (DeMaio 1980, 228).
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characteristics and demeanor can influence how a
subject fills out a survey. In races between a white and
a black, white individuals contacted by a black pollster are more likely to report that they voted for the
black candidate even if they did not (Traugott &
Price 1992; Davis 1997; Anderson et al. 1988). Likewise, the interviewer's characteristics and techniques
influence whether or not an individual is likely to respond to the survey. While this theory is beyond the
scope of this paper, its central tenet is that similarity
of attitude, appearance, background, and dress
between the interviewer and the subject will lead to
more willing compliance by respondents (see Groves,
Cialdini & Couper 1992, 484, for a summary of the
literature; see also Singer et al. 1983). We will test this
theory in a subsequent work.
Most other theories about non-respondents
link non-response tendencies to socio-economic status because education, wealth, and group experiences
are linked to feelings of efficacy and of civic responsibility. These factors also influence response rates
by affecting interest in a given survey's content or
sponsor, as we explained previously. However, while
theorists focus on socio-economic variables, empirical
studies generally focus on the demographics of nonrespondents. This is, in part, due to the ease with
which researchers can observe and measure these
characteristics of non-respondents, an important consideration when the subject is unwilling to give any
information. For example, because we can observe
the non-respondent's race and not his or her socioeconomic status, race must serve as a proxy for all the
causal variables with which it is correlated. Plus,
demographic characteristics are related to the social
groupings, the socialization processes, and thus often
the variables that socioeconomic theories emphasize.
Scholars have focused on three characteristics that
potentially influence response rates:
Age: Several studies have shown that response
rates decline as age increases (DeMaio 1980; Herzog
& Rodgers 1988). Goyder hypothesizes that older
individuals are less likely to respond because they
have less education and less personal efficacy than
younger individuals (1987, 85). It is also possible
that older voters are less likely to respond because
older voters have more difficulty filling out the forms
than younger voters (Brehm 1993, 50).
Gender: Studies between an individual's gender
and the likelihood of response have produced conflicting results. Brehm's historical data show that since
sampling methods switched from quota sampling
to probability sampling, there have been declining
proportions of men represented in surveys (1993). He
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speculates that this is due to the fact that "men are
slightly less likely to be contacted than women, as well
as more likely to refuse" (1993, 31). However, in their
experiment with telephone surveys, Dillman, Gallegos
& Frey do not find a significant relationship between
the sex of the respondent and the likelihood of nonresponse (1976).
Race: Whites are less likely to respond than
any other race (Brehm 1993). One possible explanation is that traditionally suppressed or disenfranchised minorities are more likely to be concerned
with having their opinions heard, which increases
the perceived benefits from responding to a survey.
Blacks have higher response rates than Hispanics,
possibly due to language barriers (Brehm 1993,
186).
These three potential causes of non-response
are important because each of them is also correlated
with differences in voting behavior: blacks vote
differently than whites (Boice et al. 1993; Williams
& Edy 1999), men vote differently than women
(Kaufmann and Petrocik 1999), and older voters vote
differently than younger voters (Center for Political Studies, 1996; Friedman et al. 1972). Hence,
systematic non-response in any of these groups
causes bias.
This is only a short summary of the numerous
studies and speculations on non-response. We have
previously discussed how a model using costs and
benefits can potentially unite the previous findings
on non-response in other survey types. However, it is
not clear from these findings which factors have
greater influence on whether an individual responds
to a survey. It is possible that individuals compare the
costs to the potential benefits, only consider the costs,
or only consider the benefits. It is also possible that
different groups weigh these costs differently. For
example, the population studied in an exit poll consists entirely of voters, individuals who have already
exhibited socially conscious behavior by choosing to
vote. Hence, these individuals view intangible benefits differently than their non-voting peers, which
could dilute the influence of some social costs.
In our study, the survey's content (political behavior) is a constant, as is its methodology. However,
our data allow us to examine several questions about
non-respondents. First, do demographic factors influence response rates? Second, do contextual factors
influence response rates? Third, if both demographic
factors and contextual factors influence response
rates, which has the larger impact? Fourth, if there is
systematic non-response, in what direction does that
non-response potentially bias a poll's results?
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RESEARCH DESIGN

The data for this project comes from the 2000
Utah Colleges Exit Poll. Political science and statistics
students at Brigham Young University have collaborated to design a sample of Utah voters in every election cycle since 1982. We use the exit poll's data
to predict election results for KBYU television and to
study voter characteristics and behavioral trends in
the state of Utah. David B. Magleby and Howard
Christensen chair the project.
The Utah College Exit Poll is a multistage
stratified random sample. There are 28 counties in
Utah; we include 9 of those counties· automatically in
the sample because excluding these largest counties
would automatically bias our results and because
there is a university in these counties from which we
draw our pool of interviewers. To select the rest of the
sample, we stratifY the remaining counties by the percentage of the votes in the previous election that were
cast for Democrats and select nine additional counties! within their strata by probability proportional to
size (PPS) sampling, weighting each one by its estimated voter turnout. We take another PPS sample
of the polling places within each county to determine
the locations at which we would poll. Through this
process, 93 precincts are selected for the sample. We
design our sample to poll approximately 100 people
per precinct, dividing the estimated voter turnout
at each precinct by 100 to obtain the sampling interval for each precinct, with the initial voter selected
at random.
Our sample instrument is a legal-sized, onepage, two-column questionnaire. There are five versions of the questionnaire; four of the five are double
sided. This questionnaire is long by exit poll standards. All five versions begin with questions about
how the respondent voted and end with demographic
questions. The four double-sided questionnaires
also contain a series of questions measuring the
voter's attitudes on policy concerns and testing
models of voting behavior. The remaining questionnaire consists of only the voting and demographic
questions.
The questionnaire also contains a box marked
"official use only." In this box, the interviewer records
the time of the interview, the interviewer's 10 number,
and the precinct at which the pollster contacted the
voter. Interviewers also record information about
the characteristics of non-respondents in this box.
Students from nine Utah colleges participated
as interviewers, with 250 coming from BYU and
another 300 coming from the other colleges. The
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majority of these students were undergraduates in
political science. All interviewers attended a training
session about interviewer responsibilities, interviewing techniques, and how to answer questions asked by
voters. Instruction was provided via PowerPoint and
video. In these training sessions, role-plays were used
to help the interviewers practice approaching voters.
The interviewers also received an instruction sheet
that contained a script for contacting the voter (see
appendix).
In most cases, three interviewers were assigned
to each polling site. § On Election Day, the interviewer contacted each designated voter and asked if
he or she would be willing to participate in the study.
If the voter accepted, he or she was given one of the
five questionnaires to fill out. If he or she refused,
then his or her questionnaire was marked "nonresponse" and left blank. For the purpose of our
analysis, only voters who refused to accept a questionnaire are considered non-responses; partial responses are included with questionnaires that were
completed because the respondent was initially willing to participate.
The interviewer recorded information about
the non-respondent's age, gender, race, his or her
attitude, and what reason the individual gave for not
responding in the "official use only" box. We restricted the categories of age to 18-40 years, 40-60,
and above 60 because we wanted to make judgment
of the non-respondents' ages as simple as possible for
the interviewers. Similarly, we restricted the categories of race to white and non-white to make judging the respondent's race easier for the interviewer
and because Utah's population is not very ethnically
diverse; according to the 2000 U.S. Census, whites
make up 88% of Utah's population, with Hispanics
comprising 7% and other minorities comprising
less than 5% (U.S. Census Bureau 2000). Hence we
felt that the most important dynamic would be
white/non-white.
We also collected data on three contextual
variables. The first was whether the interviewers were
stationed inside or outside the polling place. We gathered this data from a questionnaire the interviewers
completed describing their experience. To compare
the response rates in urban areas to those in rural
areas, we coded counties as either predominantly
urban or rural. The interviewers recorded the time of
the interview to the nearest 15 minutes in the "official use only" box; we coded the interviews as "morning" (interviews that occurred between 7:00 A.M.
and 12:45 P.M.), "afternoon" (1:00 to 4:45 P.M.), and
"evening" (after 5:00 P.M.).

·Cache. Salt Lake. Utah. \Xlcber, Davis. \'Xf;lshington. Carbon, Sanpete, ~Uld Iron Counties.
tIn the 2000 sample, l\·lillard, Box Elder, Tooele. Kane. Sevier. Uinrah. Duchesne. Wasatch, Summit were selected.
(~Several particip.Hing universities were only able to provide interviewers to work in shifts at their assigned precincts.
so these precincts had a different combinations of pollsters throughout the day. We will be cx~uninjng the causes of
non-response from the intcrvkwer side in .1 suhscqlH:nt work.
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DATA ANALYSIS

Table 1 summarizes our data about the
number of respondents and non-respondents in each
demographic and contextual category. From this information, we calculate the non-response rates by
dividing the number of individuals in that category
who did not respond by the total number of individuals in that category who were contacted. In doing so,
we control for the number of contacted individuals in
each group.
TABLE 1:
NON-RESPONSE RATES BY DEMOGRAPHIC CATEGORIES
AND BY CONTEXT
Variable

Category

Gender

female
male
18-40

Age

404>
60.
white
other
inside

Race
Where
Polled

Number of
Number of
Non-response
respondents
non-respondents rate
5128
034
1605
,l066
03,l
1556
2750
1286
032
2295
1555
0.4
794
895
0,55
5725
,l3.l7
0,57
428
O.2j
127
4515
2402
0,56

outside
urban
rural
morning
afternoon

Location
Time

evenin~

Congressional district!

1457
4202
2799
265.l
185.l
2149
2505

828
2318
1654
1744
1057
1029
1298

0,57
0,56
037
0.4

2039
2794

1098
1481

0,55
0,55

036
032
0.36

District
district2
district3

The data in Table 1 suggest that there are relationships between non-response rates and race, age,
and time of day in the direction the theory predicts.
Non-response rates appear to be positively associated
with age, negatively associated with the time of day,
and higher among whites than non-whites. In Table 2,
we test whether these perceived differences in nonresponse rates between categories of demographic
variables are statistically significant with a Z-test,
comparing response rates within each variable as
proportions.

Table 2 confirms that non-response rates
increase as age increases, with the most frequent nonrespondents being more than 60 years old. Likewise,
the non-response rate was higher among white voters
than among non-white voters. These relationships are
the same as those found in studies of non-response to
other types of surveys. Hence, it is probable that the
same mechanisms that make older individuals and
whites less likely to respond to surveys in general are
what make them not respond to the exit poll.
Gender was the only demographic variable
that did not significantly influence non-response
rates. Males and females were equally likely to not respond to the exit poll. Previous studies show that the
relationship between gender and the propensity to
not respond in other types of surveys was either weak
or nonexistent, so this finding is not surprising.
Time of day is the only contextual factor that
has a significant impact on non-response. The significance tests confirm that non-response rates are
highest in the morning and decline throughout the
day. Interestingly, there is no difference between nonresponse rates at urban and rural polling places,
which contradicts previous findings about response
rates in other types of surveys. While this finding
might be specific to Utah, more analysis is needed to
explain why rural polling places have response rates
that were just as high as those in urban areas.
There also are no significant differences between response rates at polling places where the
interviews were conducted outside and places
where interviews were conducted indoors. This finding is surprising because the outdoor temperatures
were below freezing for most of Utah on Election
Day. Further research is needed to explain why the
survey's context did not impact response rates. We
also tested to see if response rates differed between
TABLE

3:

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INSIDE/OUTSIDE AND
NON-RESpONSE,CONTROLLING THE TIME OF DAY
Thtte Different Time Periods

TABLE 2:
Morning

IMPACT OF VARIABLES ON NON-RESPONSE RATES

RESPONSE

,esponded

"'0 \\lilhinin/oU(
did. not rnpond.

Variable

Category I

Location
\'{nele Polled

Time

Inside
Urban
Morning
Afternoon

Congressional
District

District I
District 2

Gendet

District 1
Female
18-40

Ag'

4060
\X'hite
·r~·05;
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Category 2

outside
rural
afternoon
evening
Distrit:t 2
District 3
District 3
male
40-60
60+

other

"pS,OL '''p<,OOI

Non~Response

Non~Response

Z Statistic

Rate
Category I
0.36
0 ..%

Rate
Cate£Ory 2
037
037
036
0..12

-0.85
-1.07

OA

0.36
0.36
0.35
0.36
0.34
037
0,4
0.37

OJ5
0.5'5
035
O..:U
OA

053
0.23

Count

Coom

o..,wirrun;n/oll{
Total

C~.

On withillUl/OUt
Attnnoon

RESPONSE

responded

COUnt
0"

.~.45u"

did. nOI r.-spond.

.~.2,)"'·

Count
°O\\1fhlllin/otll

0.8.1

<--:OUlli

To'"

0.,

0.89
1.02
2.74"

Evenulg

RE.'lPONSE

•

,e:sponded

did. not rnpond.

wuhlllm!"UI

Count
00

Tocu

\\1thinm/oUi

Count
00

·8.97""

""J'.54 H

within in/OUI

\\ilhinm/out

C:Oum

O.,\\uhillll1/0Ll!

InlOur
Outside
Indside
-80
1588

Tot.u
2j68

60 ..~00

59.8°0

SU

10(,7

1580

,)').70..,

-10.0°0

12')5

40.2°0
26')';

[00.0°'0

IOO,()Oo

100.0°'0

(,0.0°0

)C}48

')31

1159

I(,l}()

615°0

65.-:'00

64 . .1°0

3.H

(,04

q.~~

)8.5"0

,)4.3 00

.'5.~0"

864

['63

2(,2'

100.0 00

100.01l0

100.0°0

606

1.\11
('-AOo

()'.2°0

(,6.')0 0

I')I~

WO

1>.\4

<n4

.,.,.1°0

.El,oo

3!.Soo

<)06

194')

28')1

IOU.OOo

100.0°0

100.0°0
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precincts where polling occurred outside and those
where it was done inside throughout the day, with the
assumption being that temperatures would be coldest
in the morning and evening. The results of that crosstabulation are in Table 3. Interestingly, significant
differences in non-response occurred only in the
afternoon, when temperatures would have been highest and contextual-type costs would have been lowest.
These preliminary analyses show that age,
race, and the time of day have significant impacts on
non-response rates. However, these variables are not
independent. For example, older voters are more
likely to vote in the morning than at any other time
of the day. Table 4 shows how the apparent relationship between the time of day and the non-response
rates might be picking up the effect of age on nonresponse. As the column percentages show, older voters make up a disproportionate amount of the voters
contacted in the morning. So, are non-response rates
higher in the morning because people are more likely
to be busy in the morning than at night, or is it
because older voters vote in the morning and the
elderly are less likely to respond?
TABLE

4:

WHO WAS CONTACTED: AGE BY TIME OF DAY
WHEN CONTATCTED
Three different time periods *AGE3 Crosstabulation
Al;Ej
Three

Morning

Ddleremtime
periods

... O-()O

60+

1283

1501

1001

within three
diffelent time periods

.\1.')°'0

3,>.-:'0(0

2(,.4%

100.0%

°QwlthinAGEj
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DEFINITION OF VARIABLES
1
Variable name
If non-response
Response
Inout
Inside
Urban
Urban
Agel 2
If berween the ages 40 and 60
Agel3
If over the age of 60
Gender!
Male
Morning
Timd
Time 5
Evening
White
Race I

0
Orherwise
Otherwise
Otherwise
Otherwise
Otherwise
Female
Otherwise
Otherwise
Otherwise
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We use a binomial logistical regression to
control for interactions between variables and In
order to compare the relative effects of each independent variable on non-response rates. Table 5 lists
the variables included in the regression and how
we coded each variable. The regressions results are
presented in Table 6.
TABLE

6:

LOGISTICAL REGRESSION RESULTS
Variable
Urban
Inout
Racel
Genderl
Time)
Timd
Agel 2

Agel3
Constant

R-Squ..ue
·"p<:.OOI

S.E.

B

0.0042
-0.0465
0.4212
-0.0328
-0.0998
0.0589
0.3911
0.9389
-1.4219
0.046

Sig
0.0536
0.055
0.1293
0.0506
0.0668
0.0614
0.0569
0.072
0.1366

Exp(B)

0.9382
0.3975
0.0011"
0.3967
0.1353
0.3376
0.0001'"
0.0001'"
0.0001'"

1.0042
0.9545
1.5237
0.9677
0.905
1.0607
1.4786
2.5572

When we control for the age of the respondents, neither time variable is statistically significant.
So even though the common perception is that response rates are lowest in the morning when people
are trying to get to work, there is no evidence that this
is the case; the most likely non-respondents are
equally likely to not respond at all hours of the day.
These data also rule out any hypothesis of interviewer
learning during the day leading to improved techniques that decrease non-response rates. It appears
that, holding the race and age of the potential interviewers constant, an individual is equally likely to reject an interviewer who is approaching a voter for the
first time that day as he is to reject an interviewer who
is approaching his one hundredth voter of the day in
the evening.
Table 6 also shows that age has the largest
impact on non-response rates. The most likely nonrespondents are those over the age of 60, with those
between the ages of 40 and 60 less likely to not respond than older voters but more likely to not
respond than voters between the ages of 18 and 40.
Likewise, white voters are 50% more likely to not respond to an exit poll than non-white voters. While
further research is needed to determine the cause of
these trends, these data lead us to reject the null
hypothesis and conclude that respondents and nonrespondents do not have equal characteristics. Instead, our findings lead us to conclude that nonresponse rates are positively associated with age and
are higher among whites than among non-whites,
taken as a group.
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CONCLUSION
Our findings have both theoretical and practical applications. Since no contextual variables were
significant when we controlled for the individual's
demographics, we conclude that the context in which
a survey is administered is less important than the
demographic characteristics of the potential respondent in causing them not to respond. In his model of
a potential voter's decision-making calculus when
deciding whether or not to respond to a survey,
Brehm emphasizes the costs imposed by contextual
factors. If our finding that context does not matter
holds up in further studies, we propose that a refinement of his model will be necessary.
Our results also lead us to conclude that exit
polls are likely to over-represent the opinions of
younger and non-white voters. Because non-white
voters tend to vote for Democrat candidates, overrepresentation of this social class will skew an exit
poll's results in that direction. In Utah, this might not
be a large concern; because minorities make up such
a small proportion of the state's population, their
impact on a poll's results is small. However, in other
states this is something that needs to be taken into
account when using exit polls. We encourage further
study of this pattern and modeling of its impact in
other states. The impact of age-bias is less clear.
However, because the non-response patterns are
systematic, we would encourage exit pollsters to use
statistical methods to control for non-response biases
in these specific directions when using data to predict
election results. We believe that understanding these
potential biases will improve the quality of exit polls'
predictions and their usefulness in studying public
opinion and voting behavior.
APPENDIX (THE INTERVIEWER'S SCRIPT)
Each of the interviewers was instructed to use the
following to approach when contacting a possible
respondent:
Hello my name is (Your name). I am a student with the Utah College Exit Poll. College
students across the state are conducting a survey today in order to predict the election results and to study political attitudes in Utah.
You have been selected at random to participate. The survey takes only a few minutes and
any information you give us will be kept
completely confidential. Would you be willing to fill out this survey for us?
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COLLECTIVE ACTION AGAINST
CHINA
ANNE CLAYTON

The focus ofthis article addresses the issues as to why collective action on the part ofimportant states in the international arena has
not been a viable option for encouraging China to enforce international human rights standards following the Tiananmen Square
massacre. Government leaders are vulnerable to domestic pressures and pursue policies in accordance with their current
self-interest. Therefore, the foilure ofcollective enforcement ofhuman rights standards in China is due to self-interested motivations
on the part ofgovernment leaders. To support this conclusion, analyzes ofempirical evidence from four states including the United
States, japan, France, and the Netherlands are provided.

INTRODUCTION
In June of 1989, the Chinese government
cracked down on pro-democracy demonstrators in
Tiananmen Square, killing, according to official
Chinese government statistics, at least three hundred
unarmed protestors. 1 Citizens throughout the world
were appalled by this display of repression, and many
states felt a need to respond to the abuse.' As human
rights have increasingly become a part of foreign
policy for many states, traditional power and security
relationships have been altered. Human rights may be
encouraged by governments through economic sanctions, diplomatic pressure, or, in extreme cases,
through military intervention. In the wake of the
Tiananmen Square massacre, many states, including
the U.S., Japan, and most European countries, placed
economic sanctions on China in protest of the abuses.
However, as time passed, governments began to reinstate normal trade relations with China, despite a
lack of marked improvement in the human rights
situation. This poses several questions for observers.
First, why was collective action against China,
manifest through sanctions and condemnations, not

effective in promoting improvement in the human
rights situation? Second, what motivates states to
pursue certain foreign policies and then to reverse
their policies without first achieving their aims?
I argue that government leaders are vulnerable to domestic pressures and will pursue policies in accordance with those pressures they perceive to be most
salient and most critical to their self-interest at the
time. Therefore, the failure of collective enforcement
of human rights standards in China in the aftermath
of the Tiananmen Square incident is due to selfinterested motivations of government leaders, not
simply power or security relationships. Leaders
support or defect from supporting policies against
China according to their perceived self-interests.
This explains why state policies towards China, in
light of its consistent human rights abuses, have been
so varied over time. Through analyzing the policies
of the United States, Japan, France, and the Netherlands towards China since the Tiananmen Square incident, I will demonstrate how their choices have
been determined largely by perceived government
interests and how identity may playa role in human
rights support.
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THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
The failure to collectively push China to
uphold human rights standards is explained by analyzing both collective action theory and perceived
government interests. Democratic governments are
subject to many domestic pressures. Because government leaders are essentially rational actors, they will
succumb to the pressures that they perceive as most
important to their aims. Particularly in democratic
states, leaders feel compelled to respond to these
pressures so as to maintain legitimacy and promote
their political survival. 3 Concepts of political survival
and legitimacy determine leaders' interests and will,
therefore, influence their policy making. Leaders
will make foreign policy decisions by choosing what
they perceive as the best option among the available
alternatives, given the political/institutional environment: State's policy choices may vary over time
because they reflect the varying pressures that leaders
feel. Domestic pressures may come from constituents, lobbyists, or the overall political climate.
Transnational actors are also able to influence states
and leaders through persuasion and socialization
using techniques such as information gathering,
citizen/government education methods, and leverage
politics.' When these transnational actors are unsuccessful in encouraging states to engage in certain
policies, this may be either due to ineffective framing
of the issue as being part of the interest or simply that
other interests posed to the governments have taken
precedence. Whether it is in response to domestic
or international pressure, government leaders act
according to the most salient issues that affect their
perceived interests.
The identity of the state, or state self-image,
plays a significant role in determining whether or not
states will respond to human rights pressures. States
have certain identities which government leaders seek
to maintain and are generally supported by public
opinion. Virtually all states maintain a self-image
that reflects attitudes towards political values and
processes." The self-image or identity emerges out of
the domestic political culture, and this identity will
largely determine state aspirations and policy preferences and often will affect choices of decision makers.' States will participate in human rights regimes to
the extent that their self-image requires this emphasis
over others. As the state identity encompasses human
rights, leaders must choose policies that conform to
that identity in order to legitimize their rule. On the
other hand, state identity may be reflected in values
that conflict with human rights, such as economic
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values. Additionally, there may exist conflicting
identities within one state, which is demonstrated
quite aptly by the U.S. and its varying policies. The
dynamics of state identity will be discussed in relation
to each of the chosen cases and their corresponding
identities.
Other theories have been advanced to explain
the same phenomena in the international sphere.
Realist theories argue that international responses to
human rights abuses have been weak because powerful states are not concerned with the enforcement of
these rights. 8 According to realist theory, states are
also considered rational actors, but their overall goals
are concerned only with power relationships and the
stability of the state.') In that case, human rights
would be of concern only to powerful states if they
threatened to undermine stability or security. Therefore, the inefficacy of other states enforcing human
rights in China results from powerful states determining that the issue does not playa major part in
their own security or self-interest. Only if the situation led to instability in the balance of power would
states determine enforcement and intervention to be
prudent. This theory, however, does not sufficiently
explain why so many states did, in fact, initially enforce economic sanctions against China in response
to the Tiananmen Square massacre and have continued to push for U.N. resolutions condemning China
for several years after.
Another argument to explain the state actions
taken towards China may include ideas of economic
dependency. That is, the states most dependent on
China economically are most likely to defect from
collective action. However, in reviewing trade statistics between China and the four states considered in
this study, I found little evidence to support this hypothesis. Japan and China demonstrated a significant
trade relationship, which is to be expected. 10 The only
other state that showed China as one of the leading
trade partners between 1989 and 1997 was the
United States. In order to lend substantial support to
this hypothesis, it would be necessary that a significant trade relationship be documented between
China and France, the second state in this study to
completely abandon collective action. Therefore, I
reject this hypothesis according to the lack of conclusive evidence.
Despite the enforcement of sanctions against
China, this attempt at collective action was unsuccessful. After only a short time of economic sanctions, states began to repeal the economic restrictions
before China had made any improvements in its
human rights situation. Japan was the first state to
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end its aid suspension in July of 1990, and most other
countries followed Japan's lead. By 1993, nearly all
governments had resumed normal trade relations
with China while still verbally criticizing its human
rights record. II Governments began to view their
interests changing with respect to China, and
their policies corresponded to those changes.
The power in collective action strategies lies in
the unified behaviors of actors, which provides sufficient pressure on those targeted to force them to
undertake the desired changes. When the front
becomes disunified, however, through defectors or
divisions, the strategy loses its persuasive abilities as
the targeted party is provided with additional options
for action where they were once restricted. Collective
action presupposes rationality for a group. Actors behave in a rational fashion when they weigh the available alternatives and choose the options which best
serve their interests. Therefore, it is not surprising
that members of these groups, if truly rational, may
weigh their own interests too heavily to cooperate in
a collective sense. I' Moreover, in any collective behavior where actors make sacrifices to achieve an end, the
prisoner's dilemma looms as a challenge to overcome.
If the collective good is not achieved, the benefits of
participation will not outweigh the costs, and thus
actors may be weaty of participation or may defect in
pursuit of individual interests. U
In the case of China, states such as Japan and
France defected from the sanctions, which allowed
China alternative trade partners and allowed it to
more easily ignore the pressures from those states
continuing with the negative trade policies. It served
the economic interests of the defector states as it provided them with economic rewards at the expense of
those states continuing with the punitive policies, as
the trade between the countries increased greatly and
important business relations were established. Finally,
it allowed China to play actors against each other
for its own gains with little incentive to continue with
the negative economic policies towards China. As the
collective action strategy broke down, the remaining
sanctions enforcers were left with few incentives to
continue with their policies, and thus, the interest of
those governments also began to change. Therefore,
the actions of the first defectors also altered the interests of the remaining states.
While arguments may be made that even the
defector states continue to encourage human rights
standards in China, even if only through different
methods such as economic liberalization, they are,
nonetheless, still motivated by domestic government
interests. In other words, the government leaders'

perceptions on how to best enforce human rights in
China change according to the policies that the leaders perceive to be in their interest. It is the leaders'
self-interest that determines whether or not to
participate in collective action and largely guides foreign policy.

THE UNITED STATES
The United States has pursued inconsistent
policies towards China since the Tiananmen Square
massacre, which have been manifest by placing
sanctions against China, only to later grant Most
Favored Nation (MFN) status, and a continuation of
condemnation through United Nations resolutions.
Why has the U.S. policy towards China been so
inconsistent? The answer to this question lies in the
interests of American leaders and their attempt to
pursue policies that best serve their interests. Their
interests may be served through various means that
must be balanced and prioritized in policy choices
and decision making. Analyzing the U.S. response to
the Tiananmen Square incident demonstrates this.
Following the Tiananmen Square massacre,
the United States (along with many other Western
countries) was quick to place sanctions on China to
demonstrate support for democracy. The vety essence
of the massacre contradicted the American image and
ideal of a democratic and freedom-loving countty.
The domestic population, as well as citizens of other
nations, was outraged at the scenes it saw on the news
and anti-China protests sprung up in many large
cities throughout the world. 14 American leaders felt
compelled to respond through punitive measures,
and President George Bush was the first major world
leader to condemn the 1989 crackdown in China. 15 It
was in the interests of the American leaders to take
such actions so as to represent the general public
sentiment and embody those American values. Concepts of democracy and freedom form an integral part
of the American identity and Americans saw these
values violated through the massacres of prodemocracy demonstrators in China. However, when
these values were not being threatened so directly and
visually, government interests shifted to other priorities, particularly economic concerns. Interestingly,
the shift of American government leaders to support economic engagement rather than economic
punishment correlates greatly to American public
opinion on this matter, as well as pressure from interest groups.
Prior to 1989, overall public opinion towards
China was growing increasingly warm, following the
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Cold War distrust, but this changed in light of the
massacre. Public opinion polls show a severe drop in
the numbers of those who held favorable opinions
of China following the Tiananmen Square massacre.
Moreover, those favorability ratings also corresponded to sharp increases in public support for pursuing human rights in foreign policy as a major
objective. I6 However, public opinion generally rises
and falls with major events or crises, and as memories
of the Tiananmen Square massacre generally
subsided, other interests took precedence in American foreign policy. Public opinion is indicative of government decisions regarding foreign and trade policy
towards China. In the height of distrust and resentment of the American public, government leaders
sharply criticized human rights abuses. As the
outraged of the public ebbed, government policies
towards China turned to those of engagement
through economic liberalization and trade.
Several active interest groups were also working to influence U.S. policy towards China. Following the Tiananmen Square massacre, business groups
were very reluctant to lobby for trade relations with
China because of the negative outlash of public opinion and media coverage of the incident. As time wore
on, however, both the general public and businesses
began to recognize the importance of the Chinese
market, and businesses began mobilizing to lobby for
trade with China. I7 R. D. Folsom, a representative of
Hong Kong business interests and an active member
of the Business Coalition for U.S.-China Trade said,
"In 1990, CEOs were reluctant to move forward
since no one wanted to be an apologist [for China's
behavior in the Tiananmen Square incident]. By
1994, companies were almost willing to stake
anything."18 In addition to U.S. business groups and
trade associations, American and Hong Kong Chambers of Commerce, Hong Kong-hired law firms and
consulting groups, and even the Chinese government
worked to lobby the U.S. in favor of profitable trade
relations with China. 19 These groups were effective in
framing the issues in a manner consistent with government leaders' interests, whereas opposing groups
experienced difficulty mobilizing resources and
presenting a unified front in order to frame the issues
within the constructs of those interests. 20
The nature of the United States government
helps to explain why interests perceived by government leaders may change. The U.S. government is
elected democratically, which leaves candidates and
incumbents at the mercy of voters to gain or maintain
leadership. If Americans are dissatisfied with some
aspect of government policy, they have a natural
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tendency to vote against the incumbent party. 21
Therefore, government decisions will largely reflect
the influence of domestic forces, whether lobbies,
public opinion, or interest groups, as these groups
will affect the interests of leaders. The main interest
of leaders is to retain or gain power; their interests
will be that which will help them to achieve this.
Therefore, shifting interests and policies may occur
according to those things that best suit their needs,
whether this includes economic concerns or promoting the national identity.
The American national identity is deeply
rooted in the founding of the country. The original
settlers often came to America in search of political,
religious, or economic freedom. The founders of
America saw this country as unique and morally
superior to other nations from the beginning. 22 While
this may serve as a glorified, and perhaps a sometimes
skewed view of reality, it has been deeply ingrained in
the American psyche. As time passed, U.S. leaders
advanced ideologies that reflected the ideal of the
United States as a champion of freedom, democracy,
and rights, the U.S. serving as a shining example to
all other countries throughout the world. 23 This is
evident in statements from American presidents such
as Franklin D. Roosevelt, who declared, "We are
fighting today for security, for progress, and for
peace, not only for ourselves but for all men, not only
for one generation but for all generations."24 More recently, Secretary of State Madeline Albright stated,
"The American public has clearly understood the importance of standing up for sound principles and
continues to take the lead in promoting freedom,
democracy, and security at home and throughout
the world. That is in America's interest. It reflects the
kind of people we are, and it is right."" The national
identity has led to both involvement and isolation in
international affairs; it is a force that government
leaders must face when determining policy options.
President Bush's original condemnation of
China was in line with the national identity, but then
other issues took precedence. Bush worked to promote positive trade relations with China as business
interests grew and perceptions of the Chinese market
became increasingly favorable, and he sought to justifY these actions through concepts of engagement as
promoting human rights. President Bush stated, "No
nation on earth has discovered a way to import the
world's goods and services while stopping foreign
ideas at the border." And in 1991, Secretary of State
James Baker said that cutting trade relations with
China would "dismantle our leverage. "c<, In other
words, the Bush administration promoted trade as

a means of encouraging China to achieve democracy
and human rights standards.
Although the Clinton administration criticized Bush's dealings with China on human rights,
claiming that more needed to be done, the new administration's policies soon closely resembled those of
Bush. 2" In fact, Clinton's rhetoric eventually changed
to support engagement of China." In 1997, after
renewing China's MFN status, Bill Clinton stated, "I
believe if we were to revoke normal trade status it
would cut off our contact with the Chinese people
and undermine our influence with the Chinese Government."2'lThrough this means, the Clinton administration was able to best serve its interests by framing
human rights support in a manner consistent with
business interests. Concepts of economic liberalization emerged as one way in which government
leaders could combine the two variables of human
rights and economic interests into the overall
perceived government interests. In this manner, leaders could pursue pro-business policies, while still
maintaining ideas congruent with the national image
of a democracy and human rights supporting nation.
Thus, they were able to maintain business interest
support as well as legitimacy in terms of the American national identity. If human rights can be linked
to self-interest or somehow support that self-interest,
then it is possible to build wide support for them in
policy. 3D Through this means, these leaders were able
to gain broad support rather than be pressured by
more radical pro-human rights organizations.
Non-governmental human rights organizations
(NGOs) and networks serve to influence political
leaders (or the public who in turn influence
political leaders) only when they are sufficiently able to
frame human rights issues in a manner that
supercedes other interests. II They must frame them so
that they are perceived to be part and parallel to the
other pursued interests. For example, the case of
the United States sanctioning China following the
Tiananmen Square massacre was framed in such a
manner that condemning China was affiliated with
promoting democracy and freedom throughout the
world." However, these NGOs failed to sufficiently
influence either the public or the government at later
times when the issues were framed along the lines of
economic liberalization as a means of achieving
improved human rights practices.
Overall, collective action between the United
States and other Western powers in response to
China's human rights abuses was unsuccessful in its
attempts to bring about change, mainly because
coordinated actions were limited by self-interest.

Following the 1989 massacre, the G-7 allies developed a common position in terms of restricting arms
exports to China, as well as international bank lending and setting limitations on senior-level diplomatic
exchanges. In June of 1990, U.S. Assistant Secretary
of State for Asian and Pacific Affairs Richard
Solomon said, "Solidarity between the Western countries on this position has sent a powerful message to
the Chinese leadership."33 However, business interests
eventually reigned supreme in light of China's
protests and threats regarding economic matters.
None of the Western powers, including the United
States, was willing to end MFN status for China as
that would have put them at a great economic disadvantage, unless done so collectively.34 In his argument to grant MFN to China, Richard Solomon
declared, "United States firms that have worked hard
over the last 10 years to develop business ties and a
market share in China would lose that business perhaps permanently to other suppliers mainly from
Europe and Japan. No other Western country ... is
planning to deny China MFN status . . . it would
eliminate a key means of influencing China in the direction of reform."3, As this statement demonstrates,
there existed a fear of losing opportunities by engaging in unilateral action, and collective action was
uncertain. By engaging in collective action, the likelihood of influencing policies through leverage is
increased, but the United States was weary of the
commitment on the part of other states to participate. The U.S. leaders did not deem promotion of
human rights in China through disciplinary economic measures to be in their interest, as other
options such as engagement theories were available,
which both supported economic considerations and
maintained the national identity.

JAPAN
Japanese-Sino relations carry a different tone
than do those of any other state that invoked sanctions against China. Japan has special interests in
China for several reasons. First, the two countries are
culturally similar and they have a long history of
trade and cultural interactions. The geographical
proximity of the two countries adds an important
dimension to the Sino-Japanese equation. China
looms as a potential geopolitical threat, and the
Japanese want to integrate China as much as possible
into the international arena as a stable partner so as to
minimize the threat that it poses. Moreover, economics are an important factor in their relationship.
Regional economic stability and integration will
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improve relations and reduce the threat of China by
making it a responsible power with vested interests in
maintaining the stability of the system. In addition,
this would provide lucrative opportunities for Japanese investors and businesses. 16 A stable geo-political
environment leads to better financial endeavors as
businesses and investors have more confidence. Because of these important issues, Japan also reacted
to the Tiananmen Square massacre in a different
manner than did many of its allies.
In order to understand the interests of the
Japanese government, it is important to first understand the governing structure. The Japanese governing structure is set forth in the 1947 Constitution,
which was essentially imposed upon the Japanese
people by the United States at the end of its occupation of Japan. Constitutionally, the Japanese system
greatly resembles the British system in that the Diet
(parliament) is composed of two houses, the lower
house being more powerful, with the executive power
lying mostly with the Cabinet and prime ministerY
In practice, however, the ruling party, the bureaucracy, and interest groups have largely merged
together to constitute the main feature of Japanese
governance." Therefore, government decision making is greatly affected by the influence these groups
are able to assert on the government leaders.
Analyzing the interaction of these groups in
policy making helps observers to better understand
the perceived government interests. Because of the
close relationship between the bureaucracy, businesses, and the government, governmental policies
largely reflect the interests of theses combined groups.
In order for the ruling party to maintain leadership in
the government, they must chose policies which
appease the desires of these powerful domestic
groups. "Money is the lubricant which oils the Japanese political machine, and every . . . Diet member
needs money by the suitcase full, in order to preserve
his or her (usually his) standing and ensure reelection."}" Where does this money come from? Most
of the money that funds the political machine comes
from businesses, which are often guided by the
bureaucracy.40 Thus, it lies in the interest of the political parties to pursue policies that serve business
interests so that those members of the Diet
may receive the necessary financial support to be
re-elected.
However, at times, other interests may be
perceived as salient for the government to pursue,
even when they are contrary to the desires of the business groups. In the aftermath of the Tiananmen
Square massacre, economic sanctions against China
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did not serve the Japanese economic interest.
Although Japan initially engaged in sanctions against
China, it was mainly due to pressures from Japan's
allies, particularly the United States." At this point,
the government's economic interests were overshadowed by security and strategic interests and the
importance of maintaining positive relations with its
allies by showing its support of such values as freedom and democracy." Japan works to cultivate its
economic power as well as cooperation with the
West. 4.\ Had Japan not responded to the massacre
with some punitive actions, the government would
have faced major criticism from abroad and perhaps
domestically. Moreover, national identity issues also
had an important impact upon the minds ofJapanese
leaders.
To understand why Japan initially imposed
sanctions, it is important to look at the national identity that Japanese leaders hold, which largely made it
susceptible to its allies' influences. Japan generally
sees itself as an advanced economic and political partner with Western nations, as well as an Asian leader. H
Japanese leaders have repeatedly stated that they are
committed to pursuing common values with Western
countries, such as democracy and human rights.;;
These commitments demonstrate the saliency of
liberal values in the Japanese national identity. Japanese leaders felt compelled, particularly when pressure
was applied by their allies, to uphold those stated
commitments. The nature of the national identity is
such that political embarrassment is liable to prompt
policy changes.'" Initially, Japanese Prime Minister
Uno responded to the massacre by stating on 6 June
1989, "In essence, we are not thinking about taking
punitive actions."4? The following day, however, the
Japanese government did freeze aid to China in
response to foreign and domestic critics. 48
It was Japan, however, that first repealed the
sanctions, beginning with an end to its aid moratorium and finally by removing all sanctions by the end
of 1990.''' This reversal in policy can be explained in
light of the diminished pressure by its allies as well as
perceived ruling elite interests.
Japan's actions lie in both perceived strategic
interests as well as economic interests. Japan, in addition to cutting its own sanctions, worked to end the
sanctions by other states as well.;o Strategically, Japan
perceived an isolated China as dangerous and desired
to integrate them into regional relationships. The lack
of interdependence leaves few restraints on a potentially aggressive country and this could be destabilizing economically as well as in terms of power
relationships. In addition, beginning in the 1970s,
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China emerged as a great economic market with
considerable potential. Economic opportunities
with China were great, and Japanese firms and the
government leaders wanted to ensure that they were
able to take advantage of this as much as possible."
Because of the government/business relationship, the
government leaders' perceived interest paralleled that
of domestic business pressures.
Therefore, government leaders' interests, defined in terms of economic and strategic interests, are
served by economic integration with China rather
than isolation. Because of overriding concerns for regional stability, which would affect financial situations as well as security, and potential economic
ventures, Japanese officials defined their interests as
continuing positive economic relations with China.
These interests were largely influenced by the bureaucratic and business interests exerting their influence
through interdependent relationships.
The action that Japan took in terms of ending
its sanctions towards China is significant in the effect
that it had on the collective action strategies to
pressure China to improve its human rights record.
Japan was the first to end sanctions, doing so in 1990,
and in the space of only a few years, nearly all of the
remaining states followed Japan's lead. \2 China had
emerged as a very important and promising market,
and the Japanese economic interests prevailed. \3
Other states were not willing to allow that market to
be bypassed because of human rights issues. The concept of the prisoners' dilemma, where those states
that defected would benefit from the enormous
economic opportunities took hold and incentives to
continue with sanctions rapidly diminished. Moreover, the efficacy of the sanctions diminished with
each defector, as it allowed China additional avenues
in pursuing economic goals and displayed disunity
among the actors that China could use to play the
actors against each other. Therefore, Japan was
the beginning of the end of a successful collective
action strategy against China.

FRANCE
For France, the most significant turning point
in collective action against China was in 1997 when
France declared that it would not support the United
Nations' resolution condemning human rights abuses
in China. France, as part of the European Union, had
backed resolutions condemning China for its human
rights policy each year since the Tiananmen Square
massacre. However, beginning in late 1994, France
began to turn from its critical stance." In June

of 1994, China's mllllster of Foreign Trade and
Economic Cooperation sponsored activities in France
to solicit trade and investment and expressed the
hope that France would compete to gain a share of
the Chinese market. so France moved even further
from condemnation of China when, in early 1997,
it engaged in two significant gestures to improve its
trade relations with China. The first was the blocking
of resolution in the European Union that would
condemn Chinas human rights abuses, and the second was President Jacques Chirac's diplomatic visit
to China.'"
Analyzing developments within the French
government lends understanding to why France
backed away from the condemning of China for
human rights abuses. France is a parliamentary
democracy, with three main branches including the
executive, legislative, and judicial branches. As part of
the executive branch, the president serves as the head
of state and manages foreign affairs. The president
also appoints a prime minister who, as the head of the
government, manages its daily operations and
appoints a cabinet of ministers. 57 Due to the democratic nature of the French government, as with the
other countries discussed, it behooves the government leaders to choose policies that will gain
support for their re-election. Therefore, we can
assume that the interests of government leaders are
to maintain their rule, or at least their party rule,
through the next elections. Those methods that help
leaders to achieve this, such as economic or foreign
policies, are then conceived to be in their self-interest.
One of the greatest looming domestic
challenges for French leaders in recent years has
been the economy, in which economic policies
have been constrained by the increasing interdependence of the European states. In 1993, France signed
the Maastricht Treaty, which called for certain economic reforms to be made in the process of European
monetary unification. 58 In fact, for France to abide by
European Monetary Union (EMU) criteria, several
austerity measures would have to be increased, including deregulation and greater competition in the public sectors, as well as privatization of certain utilities. 59
This had the potential to place great strain on an
already struggling economy.
As French economic policies have been somewhat restricted by the European integration in
monetary policies, other areas, such as international
trade, have been targeted as areas in which policies
can be made that favor the French economy. In April
of 1994, French Prime Minister Edouard Balladur
had traveled to China in hopes of developing better
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trade relations with that country; however, his
attempts proved unsuccessful. Instead, Chinese officials mainly insulted Balladur for meddling in human
rights issues."O From this point onwards, French criticism towards China was curbed. With a quelling of
criticism about Chinese human rights violations,
China's prime minister, Li Peng, visited France in
April of 1996 and placed an order for approximately
$1.5 billion worth of French-built passenger planes.'"
In 1995, the right-wing oriented Jacques
Chirac won the presidential election with pledges to
assist the unemployed, the homeless, and the poor,
but conditions did not improve. 62 France continued
to face severe economic challenges which eventually
were manifest by an unprecedented 12.8 percent
unemployment rate at the beginning of 1997.°3
Despite the economic difficulties, and fearing that he
would lose power in the 1998 elections, Chirac chose
to dissolve the National Assembly on 21 April 1997
and called for new elections to be held at the end of
May. The purpose of this was to hold elections in a
time in which his competing parties would not have
sufficient time to campaign for support enough to
win the elections.''''
In light of the economic difficulties, Chirac's
1997 campaign again centered on the pledge of job
creation and economic growth."s He tried to blame
the economic problems on the previous socialist government with such statements as, "We are behind,
and this delay has cost us dearly in terms of jobs,
taxes, debts, and illusion too."',(,Coincidentally, it was
in May of 1997 that France declared that it would
not back the U.N. resolution condemning China.07
Then, later in that month, Chirac visited China to
sign several contracts worth about $2 billion for
French companies. 68 The steps that Chirac took in
relation to China and the economy were done within
the month that campaigns were being held. If these
measures did not serve his interest as a political figure,
it is unlikely that he would have taken them at such a
critical time. The economic benefits were too great
for the government to continue its human rightscritical policies with China at the expense of Chinese
market advantages. Chirac, as president of France,
deemed it in his best interest to develop favorable
trade relations with China, which would help to
improve economic conditions, in order to increase his
chances of political survival at home.
In the case of France, a national identity that
focused on human rights was salient in 1989 and in
subsequent years when France and the rest of the
European Union condemned China by introducing
U.N. resolutions against it. China's actions were
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contrary to perceived French values and culture.
However, as economic issues became more dominant
in French domestic politics and the memories of the
Tiananmen Square massacre faded, human rights
support took a back seat to economic interests.
Nonetheless, the idea that human rights remained an
important aspect of French identity is evidenced by
the fact that, rather than ignoring human rights issues
in China altogether, the French government claimed
to be taking a new approach towards the encouragement of human rights in China through the "engagement" process."" Government leaders altered the
context of the values of the state identity so that it
legitimized decision-making interests.
France was the first to break the European
Union's previous consensus condemning China
which the EU had presented to the United Nations
Human Rights Commission each year following the
Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989. 70 Shortly thereafter, other European countries, including Germany,
Italy, Spain, and Greece, each of them with growing
economic interests in China, backed away from the
resolution. Even Canada backed away. 7, Once France
had broken the collective European action, little incentive was left for other European countries to maintain the condemnation, particularly when economic
markets were at stake. Moreover, France's action gave
China more options and leverage to use in their
international economic ventures. France, acting as
a defector state from the collective condemnation of
China, set the ball rolling for further defections and
ineffective consequences of those countries that
continued the condemnations. However, the French
defection did not sway two European states, Denmark
and the Netherlands, from backing the resolution. In
the following section I shall discuss the reasons the
Netherlands took the actions that they did.

THE NETHERLANDS
From the Tiananmen Square massacre until
the 2000 United Nation Human Rights Commission
(UNHRC) conference, the Netherlands had supported UNHRC resolutions, in conjunction with the
European Union, condemning China for human
rights abuses. Even when other European states broke
the consensus in Europe and chose not to support the
resolution in 1997, the Netherlands stood firmly
behind Denmark's move to introduce the resolution
despite blatant Chinese threats. China warned
Denmark and the Netherlands that their relations
would be damaged should they go through with the
sponsorship of another resolution before a U.N.
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Commission in Geneva. China's Foreign Ministry
spokesman, Shen Guofang, commented, "We still
hope Denmark will think seriously about the consequences of such action. I can say relations will be
severely damaged in the political and economic
trade areas."C2 This same threat was applied to the
Netherlands as well. One Chinese academic, who was
asked why the Dutch and Danes had been singled
out, as opposed to threatening the U.S. who was
another sponsor commented, "These are small countries. "~J Despite such threats, these small states never
backed away from their intentions to sponsor the
resolution. c4
The day before the resolution was to be introduced, China further threatened that they would
"delay important exchanges of officials that are under
discussion and halt exchanges and cooperation. "c,
Following the attempt at introducing the resolution
in April 1997, Dutch business interests were indeed
harmed in relation to Chinese diplomatic and economic ventures. A trade mission scheduled for June
worth between $750 million to $1 billion in deals
with China was indefinitely postponed the day
following the attempt of the Netherlands foreign
minister, Mr. Hans van Mierlo, to use his country's
influence as holder of the European Union presidency to encourage others to support the resolution
condemning China. ~(, The resolve on the part of the
Netherlands to continue with their active support of
human rights in the face of real economic and diplomatic threats from China is significant. It leads
observers to question why these values were so
important to this country, even with the risk of losing
profitable economic gains, whereas they are not so
important to other states.
The Netherlands provides an interesting analysis of international actions as it is a small European
state, consisting of only approximately 15 million
people, and yet it consistently champions human and
social rights throughout the world. 77 The Netherlands
was one of the twelve European countries that backed
Denmark on the 1997 United Nations resolution
condemning China after the larger European states
had rescinded their support in light of economic
arrangements. ~8 The Netherlands has depended on
international trade and commerce for many years and
has been very active internationally.?" If considering
only economic and diplomatic concerns, one would
likely predict that the Netherlands would attempt to
maintain positive relations with China rather than
being singled out against them. However, the national
identiry has prevented the government from choosing
these options in the past.

The Netherlands' focus on human rights as
part of the national identiry largely explains why the
Netherlands has taken the actions that it has. As
explained previously, state identiry reflects domestic
values and political processes. In the Netherlands,
there exists a strong domestic public opinion which
favors pro-human rights foreign policies. Domestic
pressures are placed on the government through
NGOs and are embodied in political parties. 80
Human rights have obtained nearly a sacred status in
Dutch political life."l The Dutch government largely
responds to human rights pressures because of the
influence of non-governmental organizations, and
political parry acceptance and support of human
rights in foreign policy. Because of the public opinion
in favor of such policies, government leaders find it
within their interest to support active human rights
policies in foreign relations so as to gain public support. One of the greatest manifestations of the overall public and government support of human rights
promotion is the government Advisory Committee
on Human Rights, which was established on a provisional basis in 1983 and then on a permanent basis
in 1985.82 While this committee has never made
any recommendations diametrically opposed to the
policies of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, its existence is significant in that it represents the government and public acceptance of human rights norms
in foreign policy.
Non-governmental organizations have long
played an important role in Dutch policy and are
largely responsible for making human rights an
important policy issue. They have been formed
around human rights issues beginning around the
1970s, often rallying around situations in particular
countries. s, NGOs are able to influence policy by
submitting suggestions and proposals to the government on how they can better pursue human rights
issues in foreign policy. Some of the important
human rights NGOs in the Netherlands include the
Netherlands Jurists Committee for Human Rights,
the Humanist Committee on Human Rights, and
Amnesry International, who boast membership of
approximately 185,000 in the Netherlands. s4
All of the four main political parties represented in the Dutch parliament include the pursuit of
human rights in foreign policy as part of their platform, although in differing degrees. The radical D66
parry is very extensive in its support of human rights
in foreign policy, while the more conservative Liberal
Parry supports human rights in foreign policy but
cautions that the Netherlands must be careful, and
that group or collective action is preferred to acting in
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isolation. 85 Members of parliament also have historically been very active human rights supporters,
although this may have decreased in recent years.
These political parties reflect the values and opinions
of the Dutch constituency and how the Dutch identity includes human rights as an integral part. The
commitment to human rights was stated by the
Ministry of Foreign Mfairs in a policy memorandum
issued in 1979 when it stated, "The Government
regards the promotion of human rights as an essential
element of its foreign policy."'6 If, in contrast to other
nations, the Dutch identity so fully entails the pursuit
of human rights in foreign policy, it is important to
analyze from where this identity emerged.
Dating back to the seventeenth century, the
Netherlands had a great interest in the rule of law,
influenced by its geographic location, lack of
resources, and need for international trade. International law was very much in the interest of this
small state so as to protect its economic and security
interests."? Therefore, the promotion of peace and
stability was important to the Netherlands and, in
modern times, continues in the form of promotion of
international aid and human rights support. However, there are other factors beyond state interests that
influenced this identity.
Some scholars argue that it was Protestantinfluenced political cultures that ingrained within the
citizens of the Netherlands (as well as other countries
such as Denmark and Sweden) a need to do good for
others and protect rights. 88 Others argue that there
remains a sense of guilt from their colonial past and a
sense of need to make up for the wrongs committed
through colonialism; but even in their colonial
experience, there was an element of moralism with
much emphasis given to the Christian missionary
programs." Whatever the origins, the Netherlands
has developed a keen sense of identity in domestic
politics that entails a high regard for human rights.
The identity is then reflected in the foreign policy of
that state.
The Netherlands was willing to participate in
collective action strategies against China, and even
advanced these ideals at some cost. However, when it
became apparent that actions would not be taken
collectively, with the majority of European Union
members backing away from critical policies towards
China, the Netherlands eventually backed away as
well. The defection of European states from collective
action increased the costs to be shouldered by the
remaining actors. The costs were difficult to bear.
Moreover, with the lack of criticism from other countries, China had various avenues to pursue in its trade
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and international policies, and the leverage through
pressure from small states diminished considerably.
Therefore, the benefits of condemning China were
outweighed by the costs of doing so, and the Dutch
government, which encourages multilateral and
collective action, decided against supporting the
U.S.-sponsored resolution to condemn China at
the U.N. Human Rights Commission convention
in April of 2000. The identity was not strong enough
to withstand the great opposition, coming even from
within the European Union.

CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the government leaders of the
United States, Japan, France, and the Netherlands
were all subject to domestic pressures in their policies
towards China following the Tiananmen Square
massacre. The experiences of these leaders illustrates
why collective action against China was unsuccessful.
The failure of collective enforcement of human rights
standards in China following the Tiananmen Square
massacre can be explained largely by self-interested
motivations on the part of governments leaders.
These leaders chose policies that best served their perceived interests, which interests revolved around gaining or maintaining leadership. Interests may be based
on a national self-image that must be maintained
for purposes of legitimacy or may revolve around
economIC concerns.
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RED CHINA BLUES:

My LONG

(NEW YORK: ANCHOR BOOKS,

MARCH FROM MAo TO Now BY JAN WONG

1996), 405pp.

Youth, they say, is wasted on the young.
Youthful exuberance, determination, boundless energy, a conquering spirit-all are wrapped up in a
fragile yet stubborn idealism that demands to be
both proven and challenged. Practicality, realism,
and even cynicism come, often painfully, with time.
It is this rite of passage, both for herself and the Chinese nation, that journalist Jan Wong chronicles in
Red China Blues: My Long March from Mao to Now.
Wong, a Canadian-born ethnic Chinese, traveled to China at the height of the Cultural Revolution. She arrived as a self-proclaimed "Montreal
Maoist," an idealist who sincerely believed Chinese
Communist propaganda and became a firsthand witness to the major events that rocked China from the
1970s to the 1990s. In the process she was transformed from an ardent disciple of Chinese Communism to an ardent critic of its failure. Wong successfully debunks many Western beliefs and theories
about Communist China and even offers up some
theories of her own, but in the final analysis, she fails
fully to come to terms with China's past or future.
Initially a true believer in Maoism, Wong
provides an important counterbalance to traditional

Western thought, calling into question many longheld beliefs and assumptions. Perhaps the most
important doubt she casts is on the long and tenaciously held assumption that capitalism is better
than communism. The young, idealistic Wong certainly didn't think so. She had lived towards the top
of a successful capitalistic society but was deeply dissatisfied with it. She saw Western society as "a hopeless mess of racism, exploitation and shopping malls"
(12). China, with its proclaimed idealism of social
equality and justice seemed instead to provide the
example of what the world should be. As she begins
to see the reality, however, the idea of China as
a shining beacon of Communism begins to fade.
Nonetheless, even as Chinese Communism begins
another "long march" on the rocky road to pseudocapitalism, Wong never is fully convinced of capitalism's success. Indeed, she continues to point out
some of its more offensive evils--official corruption
and the gap between the rich and the poor, for
example-many of which were problems under
Mao's Communism as well.
Wong also attacks the tendency to view the
Chinese as the faceless, thoughtless masses. From
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the moment stories of China began to find their way
into the Western imagination, the East was shrouded
in mystery. The West has never truly understood the
people or traditions of China, but Wong turns
the Chinese people into real live, thinking, breathing,
feeling individuals. First, she documents quite clearly
their dissatisfaction and unhappiness with Maoism
during the Cultural Revolution. For example, she was
repeatedly approached by people desperate to get
themselves or their loved ones out of China. Moreover, she describes specific instances of unhappiness
with the Communist rule, feelings which the cautious Chinese people share with her only after she has
already begun to question Communism's success.
Clearly, despite Western stereotypes and explanations
of Chinese Communism, the Chinese people are not
obedient and unquestioning sheep who lack the ability to think for themselves. Wong illustrates the independence and courage of the Chinese people as she
describes the many dissidents she encountered. Most
people, she explains, knew and privately acknowledged that the Cultural Revolution was a failure.
These people are real. Their stories are real. As Wong
describes them, the people of China are no longer
faceless or thoughtless. The result is a much more
personal connection with a country and a people generally regarded as mysterious and inexplicable. Instead, Wong brings out their universal humanness.
Much more explicitly, Wong questions the
suggestion that the Chinese people simply are not yet
capable of effectively establishing and implementing
democracy. She recognizes that many in the West feel
China is "too poor, too vast, too backward for anything but an iron dictatorship" (388). She flatly disagrees. A rural peasant, she contends, may not understand the correct terminology, but he knows which
leaders he supports and which he doesn't. Wong also
describes incidents of both open and covert rebellion,
of private complaints against the regime, and of silent
protests that demonstrate that the Chinese people can
and do think for themselves. For this reason, Wong
contends, democracy can flourish in China. However, Wong offers no response to the other impediments-size, tradition, poverty, etc.-which in Western eyes continue to make China a questionable
candidate for democracy.
Wong goes beyond merely disagreeing with
Western theories, however. She offers some of her
own. China is not just capable of implementing
democracy someday in the future-it's ready now.
With such an assertion, she implicitly suggests that
democracy is the best path for China's millions.
Moreover, she continues, it will come from the rising
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middle class. They are "the strongest proponent of
democracy in China today" (388). Wong thus proposes two theories: First, that China has a rising
middle class and second, that the middle class is open
to democracy. While she acknowledges that many
Western experts on China would find such beliefs
niive, she briefly states the basis for her argument.
The middle class, she says, are up and coming. She
has seen firsthand the evidence of their growing existence and power. They were important supporters of
the student protestors in Tiananmen Square in 1989.
Moreover, she argues, China has already changed a
great deal over the last two decades. Those changes
render China capable of implementing democracy
and enjoying a bright pluralistic future. Wong's views
seem valid, if perhaps optimistic, although it remains
unclear how and in what form China should implement democracy.
At the same time, however, Wong fails to fully
come to terms with China's past or future. First, she
fails to acknowledge or explain why Chinese Communism failed. Was it China, the system, the people?
For someone who so ardently and passionately supported Communism in China, Wong has very little
to say about its lack of success. She implicitly recognizes that even when she first arrived and thought she
saw success, it was merely well-concealed failure. The
why and how of that failure is never broached. In her
youth Wong found Western democracies ineffective
and undesirable and Communism a shining beacon
of equality. Wong's description of her discovery of
Communism's failure is clear and moving, but she
does not come to terms with why.
Just as Wong fails to fully come to terms with
China's ineffective Communist past, she also fails to
fully accept or explain its capitalist future. Though she
initially rejected the capitalism of the Western democracies, she now implicitly hails those same democracies as the model for China's future development. If
capitalism was an unprincipled failure in the 1970s,
how could it suddenly be a success by the 1990s? A
mere two decades later Wong supports the system she
once traveled thousands of miles to escape. Indeed,
the evils of capitalism do not seem to be much mitigated by the unique communism-capitalism mix in
China. Instead it has brought a widening gap between rich and poor, disillusionment, obsession with
money and material items, and loss of idealistic pursuits-all reasons why she so disliked capitalism in
the first place. Wong simply never explains the apparent paradox. The reader is left wondering whether
Wong and China changed or instead both were completely misled in their Communist faith. The future,
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Wong hopes, looks bright, but the reasons for such
optimism are shadowed. A social critic to the end, it
seems unlikely that she accepts capitalism as the answer to all of China's or the world's problems, but the
reader, like Wong during her early experiences in
China, remains in the dark.
Undoubtedly, Wong provides valuable insights
into China of the present and China of the past.
As one of the few Western observers to many of
modern China's most important events, her experiences provide helpful and important insights that

question common Western beliefs and theories on
China. Wong herself, however, seems unexpectedly
ambivalent. She fully accepts neither communism
nor capitalism. For a book that implicitly promises to
resolve the idealistic mistakes of youth, Red China
Blues is stuck somewhere between youthful idealism
and adult realism. Neither China's Communist
past nor its. capitalist future fully fits into Wong's
experiences or impressions, leaving the Western
reader to wonder which holds the answer to China's
problems.
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